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ABSTRACT 
 In the scientific study of the emotions the goal is to find natural kinds. That is, to find 
categories about which interesting scientific generalizations and predictions can be formed. Core 
affect is dimensional approach to the emotions which claims that emotions emerge from the 
more basic psychological processes of valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal 
(activation/deactivation). Lisa Feldman Barrett (2006b) has recently argued that the discrete 
emotion approach has failed to find natural kinds and thus should be dismissed as a failed 
paradigm. She offers core affect as an alternative theory that will better capture natural kinds in 
emotionally salient phenomena. In this thesis I evaluate Barrett’s claim on the basis of a 
philosophically robust understanding of natural kinds and a careful assessment of the empirical 
evidence. I argue that while core affect is not a natural kind, subsets of core affect space may be 
natural kinds. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Emotions are a central part of life. Emotional reactions represent the loss or gain of things 
we value, such as the thrill of victory or the disappointment of failure or grief at the loss of a 
parent. Emotions have long been thought of as passions defined in opposition to rationality (e.g. 
Plato Republic. 439d). At the same time emotions have also been proposed to explain a wide 
variety of phenomena that are important to rationality, such as memory (e.g. Damasio 1994). 
Emotions draw our attention to objects and we tend to have prominent memories about 
emotionally salient events. Emotions are seen as causes of diverse behaviors and psychological 
processes, as well as psychological disorders, such as anxiety disorders. Emotions are thus 
important psychological processes that are in need of explanation. Additionally, some argue that 
a scientific understanding of emotions is integral to any science of the mind or any explanation 
of consciousness (e.g. Barrett 2006b; Russell 2003; Chalmers 1999). 
 In recent years, there has been a significant amount of interest in the nature of the 
emotions from researchers in a wide variety of disciplines. Some of these include philosophers 
(e.g. Nussbaum 2001; Griffiths 1997; Prinz 2004b; Charland 2005), neuroscientists (e.g. 
Damasio 1999; Panksepp 1998), psychologists (e.g. Fridja 1986; Ekman 1999a), and more 
generally cognitive scientists (e.g. LeDoux 1996; Bradley and Lang 2000). One would expect 
that the result of this explosion of theoretical interest would be an accumulating body of 
knowledge and consensus over the nature of the emotions, but that has not been the case. Instead, 
the study of emotion has been hampered by disagreements about what the emotions are, how best 
to study them, and how best to interpret the existing empirical evidence.  
Recently Lisa Feldman Barrett has argued that emotion theory has been hindered not so 
much by disagreement, but by the wide acceptance of the notion that discrete emotions, such as 
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anger, fear, and sadness, are natural kinds (2006b).1 Natural kinds are the holy grail of scientific 
investigation because they allow scientists to form generalizations and predictions about the 
given category. But Barrett claims that the empirical evidence does not warrant the assumption 
that the discrete emotions are categories that are apt for generalizations and predictions. Instead 
she argues that the scientific study of emotion should focus on more fundamental processes, 
rather than these broad categories. Barrett presents core affect as a theory that focuses on these 
fundamental processes. Core affect is a dimensional, neuropsychological category corresponding 
to levels of valence (pleasant /unpleasant) and arousal (activation /deactivation). Core affect 
theorists, such as Lisa Feldman Barrett and James A. Russell  claim that emotions emerge from 
this neuropsychological category and Barrett further argues that “the empirical case supporting 
the hypothesis that core affect is a natural kind is suggestive” (2006b, 48).2  
In this paper I will evaluate the empirical case for Barrett’s hypothesis on the basis of a 
more philosophical understanding of natural kinds and a careful assessment of the evidence. Paul 
Griffiths has pointed out that “questions about the nature of the emotions cannot be answered in 
the armchair alone but must be sought in part by empirical investigation of emotional 
phenomena” (1997, 1). I will do just that. I will argue that the empirical evidence supports what 
Carl Craver (2004) has called “kind splitting.” 3 In other words, splitting the proposed kind (core 
affect) is more likely to yield the kinds about which inductive generalizations and predictions can 
                                                 
1 Emotion terms that refer to linguistic forms will be indicated by quotations, while emotion categories or the 
discrete emotions will be indicated by italics. For example, “joy” refers to the word itself as used by the folk and joy 
refers to the discrete emotion.  
2 Being a good scientist, Barrett emphasizes that “the crucial experiments have yet to be done” and that we should 
withhold judgment until further empirical evidence is collected (48). 
3 Craver defines kind splitting as “a common (but rarely explicit) methodological assumption in neuroscience and 
elsewhere that discovering a kind to be dissociably realized [cases where a proposed kind is found to be realized by 
more than one distinct and independent realizer] mandates splitting the kind into as many as there are dissociable 
realizers” (960). The realizers vary according to the explanatory role they play in the theory. In the case of 
neuroscience and, arguably, cognitive science the realizers are often thought of as brain areas and/or scientifically 
relevant properties.  
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be formed. I will attempt to show that four potential candidates for natural kindhood can be 
located in subsets of the core affective category. Natural kinds are the primary subject of 
scientific research as well as much philosophical analysis of the emotions. Therefore, the 
discovery of four potential natural kinds in the core affective category contributes to future 
scientific research and philosophical analysis of the emotions.     
In chapter two, I will discuss the major theoretical frameworks at play in current emotion 
theory, introduce core affect theory, and examine whether or not the dimensions of valence and 
arousal are well-defined. In chapter three, I will begin by explaining Richard Boyd’s theory of 
natural kinds (1991; 1999), which Barrett assumes for her analysis (2006b). I will then 
reconstruct Barrett’s argument that discrete emotions are not natural kinds and examine her 
argument in favor of the natural kind status of core affect. In chapter four I will assess the 
evidence to see if, in fact, core affect is a natural kind. I will argue, contra Barrett, that the 
evidence in favor of core affect being a natural kind is not suggestive. This being said, there may 
be a sense in which four subsets of the broad core affective category may be natural kinds. I will 
conclude with what I think core affect can add to emotion theory and a general lesson for 
emotion theorists looking for natural kinds: splitting proposed kinds is the best avenue for 
discovering natural kinds. 
CHAPTER 2: CORE AFFECT AND ITS HISTORICAL ROOTS 
J. Russell defines core affect as “a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible 
as a simple nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of hedonic (pleasure-displeasure) and 
arousal (sleepy-activated) values” (2003, 147). He argues that valence and arousal have played a 
4 
fundamental role in theories of emotion, going back to the beginning of psychology.4 Core affect 
is proposed as an alternate theoretical paradigm to the dominant paradigm in current emotion 
theory, the discrete emotion approach. Since core affect is hailed by Barrett and Russell as a 
better theory of the emotions, it is important to begin by discussing what a good theory of the 
emotions should look like.  
 Roughly speaking, a good theory of the emotions should have explanatory and predictive 
power. It should tell us why a given emotion is present, predict when an emotion will be present, 
and do so better than alternative theories. The theory should be applicable to emotions in all 
individuals that experience them and apply to all cultures in which emotions are exhibited. In this 
chapter, I will begin with a general outline of the theoretical frameworks in emotion theory and 
explain core affect theory in more detail. This will prepare us to compare and contrast different 
approaches to the study of emotions in terms of their explanatory and predictive power.   
2.1- Theoretical Frameworks in Emotion Theory 
A fundamental question in emotion theory is whether emotions are best studied as broad 
dimensions or as discrete units (such as the surprise unit, the sadness unit, etc.). The former 
approach finds its origins in Wilhelm Wundt (1873; 1897), while the latter finds its origins in 
William James (1884).5 Ever since, there has been a tension between dimensional and discrete 
approaches over which theoretical framework best captures the emotions.6 Core affect theorists 
adopt a dimensional framework and claim that their approach is scientifically more fruitful than 
the discrete emotions framework. Discrete emotion theorists disagree and argue that emotions 
                                                 
4 According to Russell, early psychologists like Wilhem Wundt, Carl Stumpf, and Edward Bradford Titchner all 
posited something similar to core affect. In particular Wundt “identified dimensions of pleasant-unpleasant, tension-
relaxation, and excitement-calm as the basis of feeling and emotion” (Russell 2003, 153). 
5 Wundt and James are considered the fathers of modern psychology. 
6 See Izard and Azkerman (2000) for a discussion of the historical debate and tensions that have arisen between 
dimensional and discrete emotion theorists.  
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should be studied as discrete units. In what follows I will briefly describe these two approaches 
in their contemporary forms. 
The discrete emotions approach starts with folk terms for the emotions, such as 
“happiness,” “disgust,” “contempt,” and so on, and attempts to construct theories about what the 
folk emotion terms refer to in the world. Discrete emotion theorists claim that there are a small 
number of folk emotions (for example, “fear,” “anger,” “joy,” and “sadness”) that can be 
scientifically and theoretically identified and distinguished from one another. The underlying 
assumption is that some folk emotion terms refer to real distinctions in the world, or at least they 
partially refer to them, and can be precisified so as to be useful in scientific theories.7 For 
example, the folk term “sadness” refers to a discrete emotion, sadness, because there are unique 
properties associated with it, such as distinct contractions of facial muscles and signature bodily 
responses. Moreover, the instantiation of these properties may be due to a common cause, 
assumed to be in the brain, such as activity in the subcallosal cingulate. According to this 
approach, the discrete emotions are the proper focus of scientific studies. 
Discrete emotion theorists argue over the number of discrete emotions and postulate 
different theories about how to theoretically and scientifically identify these emotions. Three 
examples of discrete emotion theories are cognitivism (e.g. Arnold, 1960; Solomon, 2004), neo-
Jamesianism (e.g. Damasio, 1999; Prinz 2004c), and basic emotions or affect program theory 
(e.g. Ekman, 1999a; Griffiths, 1997). It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to elaborate on 
the nuances of these theories. What follows is a brief sketch of these three discrete emotion 
theories. The goal is to provide the reader with a preliminary understanding of the discrete 
emotion approach. 
                                                 
7 It is important to keep in mind that discrete emotions do not equate to folk emotion terms. The discrete emotion 
approach begins with these terms, but may need to eliminate certain properties associated with them in order to find 
a precise scientific term.  
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Cognitivism claims that discrete emotions can be theoretically and scientifically 
identified and distinguished from each other by the way an object is judged or appraised. The 
basic slogan of the research program is: “Emotions are appraisals or value judgments” 
(Nussbaum 2001, 4). The psychologist Magda Arnold, for instance, claimed that the differences 
between discrete emotions can be explained by an organism’s direct, intuitive, and immediate 
appraisal of environmental changes that affect their well-being (1960).8 For example, fear may 
be identified by the appraisal that an object, like a tiger, is dangerous. Grief may be identified by 
the appraisal that an important object, like a spouse, has been lost, and anger by the appraisal 
that someone has been mistreated.  
Neo-Jamesianism is a second example of a discrete emotion theory. Neo-Jamesians argue 
that discrete emotions are scientifically and theoretically identified and distinguished by complex 
changes in the body in reaction to appraisals of emotionally relevant stimuli. According to Jesse 
Prinz, “emotions are perceptions (conscious or unconscious) of patterned changes in the body 
(construed inclusively)” (2004c, 45). These bodily changes are correlated with activations in 
brain areas associated with bodily perception, such as the somatosensory cortex.9 For example, 
disgust may be identified by the sensation that one’s “skin is crawling” and nausea. Fear may be 
identified by a rise in body temperature, resulting in sweating, and the “freezing” of one’s limbs, 
and anger may be identified by an increase in heart rate and contractions in the brow area.         
                                                 
8 Arnold argued that every organism is constantly appraising the environment around them in order to identify things 
that are helpful or harmful, easy or hard to avoid or approach, and which objects are present or absent. However, 
organisms do differ in their level and ability of appraisal. While Arnold’s theory posited discrete emotions as the 
entities that best explain emotional phenomena, many of her intellectual predecessors posited dimensions instead. 
Most current appraisal theories, at least in the natural sciences, assume a dimensional approach, although some, such 
as Lazarus (1991), have argued for a hybrid theory. See Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) for a detailed discussion of 
appraisal theories.     
9 The somatosensory cortex is an area of the brain that receives information about general sensations, such as touch, 
pain, pressure, temperature, and proprioception (the sensation of joint and muscle position). 
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A third influential discrete emotion theory is affect program theory (or basic emotions 
theory), arguably the dominant non-dimensional approach in contemporary emotion theory. The 
fundamental claim is that discrete emotions are distinguished and identified by a set of complex 
responses to the emoter’s environment that are modular (Fodor, 1983)10 and evolutionarily 
determined.11 According to Ekman, “the primary function of emotion is to mobilize the organism 
to deal quickly with important interpersonal encounters, prepared to do so by what types of 
activity have been adaptive in the past [as a species and as individuals]” (1999b, 46). A few of 
the responses associated with the discrete emotions by affect program theorists are pan-culturally 
recognized facial expressions, distinctive physiology, quick onset, and presence in non-humans, 
such as primates.12 Ekman has argued that at least fear, anger, sadness, disgust, joy, and surprise 
are affect programs or basic emotions in this sense. For example, surprise may be identified by a 
distinct facial expression that involves the raising of the eyebrows, increased heart rate, and rapid 
onset, and that these responses are present in non-humans.  
What these three discrete emotion theories share are two assumptions about how 
scientists should study the emotions. First, the assumption that emotions are best captured in 
terms of discrete units (e.g. the fear unit, the anger unit, and so on) and second, the assumption 
that folk terms are the natural starting point for any scientific investigation of the emotions. What 
differentiates these theories, on the other hand, is how to identify scientifically fruitful discrete 
                                                 
10 A module on Fodor’s account is “domain specific, innately specified, hardwired, autonomous, and not assembled” 
(1983, 37). One of the main points of a modular is that they are informationally encapsulated (i.e. the module cannot 
access any mental process or information outside of itself, only information in the specific module can be used, and 
this information can contradict information stored in other modules). Griffiths has argued that this is the most 
important aspect of the basic emotion theory (1997).  
11 There are a variety of different versions of the basic emotion theory (e.g. Ekman, 1999b; Fridja, 1986; Izard, 
1977; Plutchik, 1980; Panksepp, 1998), but most agree with this fundamental claim. These accounts diverge on 
issues such as the number of basic emotions and which of the responses are needed to pick out particular basic 
emotions. See Ortony and Turner (1990) for a detailed discussion of the differences between these theories. I will 
focus on Ekman’s version here because, arguably, he was the first to propose it and provide empirical support for it 
(1971; 1992; Ekman et al., 1983).   
12 For a list of the characteristic responses see table 3.1 in Ekman (1999b, 56).  
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emotions. For example, cognitivists claim that fear is identified by the judgment that an object is 
dangerous. Neo-Jamesians claim that fear should be identified by the perception of complex 
bodily changes, such as sweat and increased heart rate. Affect program theorists or basic emotion 
theorists claim that fear should be identified by a complex set of reactions to the emoter’s 
environment that are evolutionarily determined, such as involuntary physiological reactions, the 
production of a suite of distinct facial expressions, characteristic behavioral responses, and so on. 
This completes my introduction of the discrete emotions approaches in emotion theory. Let us 
now turn to the dimensional approach, of which core affect theory is the most prominent 
example.   
In the current scientific study of emotions, dimensional theorists believe that we should 
focus on the underlying constituents of the discrete emotions. All dimensional theories share one 
assumption, namely that all discrete emotions share more basic psychological properties. It is 
argued that emotions emerge from these more basic properties and that focusing on these 
properties is scientifically more fruitful than focusing on discrete emotions. According to 
dimensional theorists, discrete emotion categories do not represent independent phenomena to be 
explained and identified one by one. Rather, emotion categories are higher-order phenomena 
which emerge from changes along continuous dimensions of lower-order properties. These 
properties are commonly defined by two dimensions, although a dimensional theory can posit as 
many dimensions as is needed in order to achieve explanatory and predictive power. Core affect 
posits valence and arousal as the key dimensions. In the next section I will elaborate on these. 
2.2- Core Affect Introduced 
As I previously mentioned, core affect is a neuropsychological category corresponding to 
combinations of valence and arousal levels. Valence is broadly understood as hedonic tone 
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(positive/negative or pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal is broadly understood as 
activation/deactivation of the mind and body. For example, “joy” is positively valenced and 
highly arousing and “disgust” is negatively valenced and mildly arousing. Core affect is not just 
a theory about the emotions, but about all affective states.13 As Russell (2003, 146) puts it:   
The scope of the proposed framework is broader than emotion (including states such as 
comfort, serenity, drowsiness, and lethargy). Gone is the assumption that all events called 
emotion or fear or anger can be accounted for in the same way. These concepts are not 
abandoned but are put in their proper place as folk rather than scientific concepts, and 
their role limited to whatever role folk concepts actually play in emotion (and in 
perception of emotion in others).14  
 
Core affect theorists claim that emotions “emerge from” affective states and that affective states 
are best described as combinations of valence and arousal values (Barrett 2007a). These states of 
valence and arousal endow the emoters with a kind of “core knowledge about whether objects or 
events are helpful or harmful, rewarding or threatening, calling for acceptance or rejection” 
(Barrett 2007a, 377). Here is Barrett’s (2007a, 377) definition of core affect: 
 Information about the external world… indicates whether an object or situation is  
helpful or harmful, rewarding or threatening, requiring approach or withdrawal.  
With awareness, core affect is experienced as feelings of pleasure or displeasure  
that are to some extent arousing or quieting.  
 
The clearest way to conceive of the core affective category is in terms of the so-called 
“core affect circumplex.” Broadly speaking, a circumplex is a visual representation of certain 
aspects of a theoretically defined psychological space, aiming to capture certain psychological 
                                                 
13 Nico H. Fridja (2000) gives the best explanation of the term “affective” that I have seen. He explains that salient 
events (events associated with strong feelings) often intrude upon goal-directed behavior and thought and at times 
even interrupt it. Salient events can also elicit unplanned thought and behavior. These sort of salient feelings or 
events “affect” the person. According to Fridja, the predecessors to the notion of affect are the Greek pathema, the 
Latin affectus, and the early French and English “passion.” These terms all indicate a form of behavior that is in 
some sense passive, which differs from “action,” and the terms contrast affect and passion. Salient events intrude 
upon goal-directed behavior and may elicit desires, thoughts, plans, and behaviors that persist over time. Some of 
these behaviors may even be performed regardless of the cost, moral objections, and external obstacles. According 
to Fridja, this is the more modern sense of passion- the behaviors, desires, and thoughts that suggest urges with 
considerable force. Although, core affect is a broad category that encompasses all affective states, in this paper I will 
typically focus on the emotions. The generality of core affect will be discussed where relevant.        
14 Emphasis in original.  
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phenomena. In the case of core affect, the psychological space is represented by two axes: 
valence and arousal. Valence is plotted along the horizontal axis and arousal is plotted along the 
vertical axis. Below is the core affect circumplex: 
:  
In order to map the affective space portrayed above, core affect theorists ask individuals to make 
judgments about the relationships between valence and arousal for various affective terms using 
surveys and self-reports. For instance, they ask subjects a number of questions about the levels of 
valence and arousal for terms like “fatigued,” “contented,” “happy,” and “stressed” and then 
chart how individuals group the concepts of valence and arousal. Just to give an example, 
subjects consistently rate “depressed” and “fatigued” as low activation and negative valence. The 
theorists then take the information from the surveys and using statistical techniques form the 
circumplex and plot the affective space (see Barrett 1996). I will return to the evidence that 
supports the core affective circumplex in section 3.3.1.2.   
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Since core affect theorists claim that emotions emerge from these more basic 
psychological states of valence and arousal, the prototypical emotions are supposed to map onto 
the circumplex, as shown above. For example, “fear” and “anger” are commonly rated as both 
being highly arousing and negatively valenced, so they will be placed in the top left quadrant. 
“Happiness” is commonly rated as both being positively valenced and highly arousing, so it is 
placed in the top right quadrant. It is important to keep the circumplex in mind as it is a visual 
representation of the core affect category. Since core affect is defined as combinations of valence 
and arousal, it is important to figure out what core affect theorists mean by these terms. This is 
the task for the next section.  
2.3- Are Valence and Arousal Well-Defined? 
As it turns out, there are multiple definitions put forth for both valence and arousal by 
core affect theorists, some of which may not be compatible with each other. I do not argue that 
these definitions cannot be made compatible, but rather suggest that doing so would require 
clarifications of deep methodological issues. A thorough discussion of this issue, however, lies 
outside the scope of this thesis. What I need is a clear, yet admittedly provisional understanding 
of valence and arousal, which I will then adopt in the subsequent chapters.   
The first dimension I will examine is arousal, which is characterized as a continuum from 
a state of maximal activation to a state of maximal deactivation (visually represented by the 
vertical axis of the circumplex). “Activation is a general mobilization in preparation for vigorous 
action” and “the feeling [of arousal] is one’s sense of mobilization and energy” (Russell 2003, 
150 and 148). The intuition behind positing arousal as a dimension is that all emotions seem to 
vary in arousal. For example, “anger” can range from mild irritation (low arousal) to “rage” 
(high arousal). It is hard to imagine an emotion that does not vary in arousal and so it appears 
12 
that arousal is central to emotion. Additionally, arousal appears to be an integral component in 
explaining an emoter’s behavioral reactions. Organisms appear to mobilize resources for actions 
according to the level of intensity of an occurent emotion. “Rage” mobilizes a high amount of 
energy so that an individual is ready to fight and refocuses the subject’s attention almost 
exclusively on the eliciting stimuli. Mild irritation, on the other hand, mobilizes a low amount of 
energy that does not necessarily prepare an individual to fight, and does not refocus attention 
exclusively.   
Arousal can be explained in at least two ways, as physiological arousal and felt arousal. 
Physiological arousal essentially involves the body and is measured by reactions in the 
autonomic nervous system.15 The body is physiologically aroused when running, for example, 
and deactivated when sleeping. Felt arousal is similar, but does not necessarily involve the body 
although it often does. A person may feel aroused when they are anxious, but that feeling may or 
may not correspond to something that can be physically measured.  
Barrett seems to combine these two definitions and defines arousal as “feeling as if the 
mind or body is active, as in aroused, attentive, or wound-up, versus feeling that the mind or 
body is still, as in quiet, still, or sleepy. Felt activation is typically related to, but does not have a 
one-to-one correspondence with, actual physiologic activity” (2007a, 379).16 Clearly one 
component of what is “felt” in felt arousal is the bodily changes involved in physiological 
arousal, but “felt” also indicates feelings that the mind is aroused. To summarize, the dimension 
                                                 
15 The autonomic nervous system consists of two contrasting neuron pathways: the parasympathetic (controls the 
body when at rest) and the sympathetic (controls the body in “flight-or-fight” situations). The autonomic nervous 
system is not under voluntary control (and so is thought to be a good measure of the effects of the emotions since it 
eliminates socially learned reactions), is controlled by the hypothalamus, and effects contractions of smooth muscles 
and glands. Measurements of the autonomic nervous system include heart rate, blood pressure and flow, respiration, 
and movement of the eyes. The scientific assumption is that correlating autonomic nervous system reactions with 
categories provides evidence for an underlying causal mechanism. See Barrett 2006b for more on this assumption. 
16 Emphasis added. 
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of arousal is defied both as felt arousal and physiological arousal with an emphasis placed on felt 
arousal.  
There are numerous philosophical and scientific problems with defining arousal in terms 
of felt arousal. On the scientific side, it is difficult to see how a scientist would measure felt 
arousal. According to Barrett this can be accomplished through “cross-sectional studies 
examining how…participants self-report their experiences using common… emotion words [and 
these self-reports] often give evidence of arousal-based content” (2007a, 379). Barrett has argued 
that self-reports do tell us about the phenomenal experience of subjects and has codified a 
method to access the phenomenological feel of core affect (1996; 1997; 2004a; 2007a). But it is 
questionable whether self-reports can capture the phenomenology of subjective experience. It is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis to discuss the issue in detail, but one of the central 
objections to such a method is that self-reports essentially involve introspection on the part of the 
subject, which may alter the phenomena in question.17 In the subsequent chapters I will adopt the 
physiological notion of arousal and leave behind these problematic claims about felt arousal. I 
will return to my provisional notion of arousal at the end of this section. 
The second dimension of core affect is valence. Valence is characterized as a continuum 
from a state of maximal pleasantness to a state of maximal unpleasantness (visually represented 
by the horizontal axis of the circumplex). “Pleasure-displeasure (or valence) is a dimension of 
experience that refers to hedonic tone” (Barrett 1999b, 10). Intuitively all emotions seem to be 
either pleasant or unpleasant. For example, “fear” seems unpleasant whereas “joy” seems 
pleasant and “sadness” seems unpleasant whereas “happiness” seems pleasant.     
                                                 
17 For a more detailed philosophical discussion of the problems and virtues of self-reports see Chalmers 1998 and 
2004. 
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The following is Barrett’s more detailed explanation of valence: “the valenced aspect of 
core affect has been called many things- hedonic tone, utility, good-bad, mood, pleasure-pain, 
approach-withdrawal, rewarding-punishing, appetitive-aversive, positive-negative- but the 
similarity is clear” (2006d, 40). Philosophers have argued that the similarities are not clear and 
that the term “valence” is ambiguous (e.g. Prinz, 2004a; Charland, 2005). To explore this alleged 
ambiguity I will look at two of these notions: positive-negative and approach-withdrawal. The 
positive-negative notion of valence is often explained in terms of pleasant and unpleasant 
feelings. For example, “joy” is a positive emotion in which pleasant feelings are involved and 
“fear” is a negative emotion in which unpleasant feelings are involved. On the other hand, the 
approach-withdrawal notion of valence is often explained in terms of approach and withdrawal 
behaviors. For example, “love” elicits the tendency to approach the person that invokes the 
positive emotion and “disgust” elicits the tendency to withdrawal or stay away from the person 
who invokes the negative emotion. The first notion fundamentally involves a feeling aspect, 
while the second can be explained in terms of behaviors.  
Defining valence as fundamentally involving feelings or behaviors radically changes the 
types of experiments that can be done to study valence and the scope of the conclusions that can 
be drawn. The feeling aspect limits the subjects involved in the experiment to those who possess 
language, while defining valence in terms of behaviors widens the range of potential 
experimental subjects and thus the conclusions that can be drawn. For example, if a researcher 
uses the notion of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, then the method will, in all likelihood, be to 
use self-reports to try and access these feelings. This methodology excludes infants and non-
humans. On the other hand, if a researcher uses the notion of approach-withdrawal, then a 
number of different methods could be used and some methods will be unacceptable if used on 
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humans. For example, cocaine could be used to elicit approach behaviors and electric shocks to 
elicit withdrawal behaviors. In this case valence includes non-humans and there may be 
interesting homologous structures of the mammalian brain involved in valence. So how the 
experiment is conducted and the scope of the conclusions are affected by the notion of valence 
that is adopted.18 Although I will use the terms “positive valence” and “negative valence” in 
subsequent chapters, I will not adopt the feeling notion of valence. For the purposes of this 
thesis, “valence” is to be understood in the behavior sense described above.  
To summarize, both valence and arousal are mongrel concepts. I have argued that arousal 
is defined both in terms of feelings and physiological responses and valence is defined both in 
terms of feelings and behaviors. I have tried to show above that the adoption of a 
phenomenological notion of valence and arousal are problematic. The core affect category would 
be much clearer, more useful and less objectionable if these phenomenological claims were left 
behind. At least until there are advances in measuring phenomenological data and the 
methodological issues are satisfactorily addressed. I do not mean to revert back to behaviorism 
and I acknowledge that an important aspect of the emotions is that they feel a certain way, but 
given the issues involved in recording subjective experience this data cannot be included in the 
assessment of core affect as a natural kind. Thus, in the subsequent chapters I will focus solely 
on the physiological and behavioral notions. For the purposes of my thesis, I will understand 
valence and arousal, and consequently, core affect, as essentially behavioral and physiological.   
CHAPTER 3: THE CASE FOR CORE AFFECT 
Now that we have at least a preliminary understanding of core affect, we are in a position 
to asses Barrett’s arguments against discrete emotions and in favor of core affect (2006b). Barrett 
                                                 
18 I am not alone in thinking that this is problematic. See Panksepp (2007) for a further discussion of this problem. 
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argues that the empirical evidence does not support the claim that there exist discrete emotion 
categories about which scientists could formulate scientifically interesting inductive 
generalizations. To put it briefly, she thinks that discrete emotion categories are not natural 
kinds. On the other hand, she argues that the empirical evidence suggests that core affect may be 
a natural kind. In the first section of this chapter I will explain Richard Boyd’s notion of natural 
kinds to ground my discussion of Barrett’s arguments in a philosophically robust notion of 
natural kinds. In the second and third sections I will reconstruct Barrett’s arguments in some 
detail. 
3.1- What is a Natural Kind? 
There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about natural kinds (for a sample of recent 
discussions on natural kinds, see Hacking 1991; Boyd 1999; Millikan 1999; LaPorte 2003; 
Griffiths 2004b). The central idea is that natural kinds “carve nature at its joints” (Plato 
Statesman 287c) and thus provide us with fundamental ways to classify objects and study their 
properties. The notion of a natural kind is essentially tied up with the problem of induction 
because a natural kind singles out a category about which scientific generalizations can be 
formed (Machery, 2005; Mill, 1843; Quine, 1969; Boyd, 1991, 1999; Hacking, 1991). Natural 
kinds are contrasted with arbitrary groupings of things for which only a few or no generalizations 
can be formed. For example, species such as “whales” and chemical elements such as “oxygen” 
are natural kinds, but collections of jewels and things that weigh more than 50 pounds are 
arbitrary groups. Members of a natural kind must share, non-accidentally, a number of 
theoretically and scientifically important properties suitable to produce generalizations about 
them. These shared properties mark natural kinds as “the building blocks of scientific 
generalizations” (Machery 2005, 446). Since scientific generalizations are a goal of most 
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empirical sciences, scientists aim to develop empirical theories that identify natural kinds in their 
domain.  
Given this general notion of a natural kind, philosophers have proposed many different 
ways to characterize them (e.g. Locke, 1690; Venn, 1886; Russell, 1948; Mill, 1843; Kripke, 
1980; Boyd, 1991). The most influential recent notion of natural kinds comes from Richard Boyd 
(1991; 1999). Boyd advocates a causal notion of natural kinds where a kind is natural insofar as 
it constitutes a maximal class whose instances share non-accidentally many, but not all, 
scientifically relevant properties.19 He proposes that this notion of natural kinds is captured by 
what he terms a “causal homeostatic property cluster.” Boyd writes: 
I argue that there are a number of scientifically important kinds (properties,  
relations, etc.) whose natural definitions are very much like the property cluster  
definitions postulated by ordinary-language philosophers except that the unity of  
properties in the defining cluster is mainly causal rather than conceptual. The  
natural definition of one of these homeostatic property cluster kinds is determined  
by the members of a cluster of often co-occurring properties and by the  
(“homeostatic”) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence.20 
 
The members of a homeostatic property cluster kind do not have to share all the same properties. 
Instead, Boyd proposes that what matters is that the imperfectly shared properties are shared 
non-accidentally due to a common causal mechanism. On the basis of (i) the imperfectly shared 
cluster of properties and (ii) a common causal (homeostatic) mechanism that underlies the 
properties, we can, respectively, identify instances of a natural kind, and form inductive 
generalizations about the kind.  
                                                 
19 Boyd claims that his theory of natural kinds is independent of any general metaphysical realist claims (1991). He 
argues that both realists and empiricists should accept his theory. Realists will accept that natural kind terms are 
projectable (provide explanations and predictions) because these terms refer to real causal structures in the world. 
Boyd also believes that empiricists should accept that natural kind terms are projectable because there are 
empirically adequate background theories that allow us to construct projectable terms. It is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to analyze this claim, but see Griffiths (1997) for more on this argument.   
20 Boyd (1991), 141. Emphasis in original 
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According to Boyd, the paradigmatic example of a natural kind is “species” because species 
specify “categories apt for induction and explanation in [biological] science” (1991, 142). The 
natural kind “species” constitutes a homeostatic property cluster because the fact that species 
members (imperfectly) share morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties is caused 
by the mechanism of natural selection (the exchange of genetic materials) underlying the 
property cluster.21 In other words, members of a species do not have to share necessary and 
sufficient properties for being “species” members. In fact, Boyd believes that there will 
necessarily be indeterminacy in the extension of species because speciation depends on 
populations that are intermediate between the parent species and the emerging new species. Boyd 
(1991, 142) writes:  
Any ‘refinement’ of classification which artificially eliminated the resulting  
indeterminacy in classification would obscure the central fact about heritable  
variations in phenotype upon which biological evolution depends and would be  
scientifically inappropriate and misleading.  
 
Since “species” is a natural kind, it seems that some natural kinds may be counterexamples to 
“essentialist” theories that require necessary and sufficient conditions of membership for natural 
kinds (e.g., Kripke 1980). Additionally, the species example demonstrates that the notion of a 
homeostatic property cluster captures the way at least some paradigmatic natural kinds are used.  
 This being said, Ruth Millikan (1999) has offered a different notion of natural kinds. 
According to Millikan, at least some “kinds are defined by reference to historical relations 
among members, not, in the first instance, by reference to properties” (54). On her view, natural 
kinds are best characterized by the historical relations between members of the kind and not the 
properties that the members share due to a causal mechanism. Although Millikan’s notion is 
different than Boyd’s, it is not clear if Millikan’s view is a critique of Boyd’s theory. She admits 
                                                 
21 Although there are debates, both in philosophy and biology, about how to define a species, most agree that the 
exchange of genetic material is essential to speciation. 
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this in a footnote: “I am not clear whether the next few paragraphs are best read as exegesis of 
Boyd or as criticism” (Ibid., 63). Additionally, Boyd argues that Millikan’s ‘historical kinds’ 
form a “sub-set of the HPC kinds” (Boyd 1999, 84). In other words, Boyd believes that 
Millikan’s notion of natural kinds is reducible to his theory. I will not get into the details of this 
debate and assume Boyd’s notion of natural kinds in what follows. 
There are four reasons why I will assume Boyd’s notion of natural kinds. First, Boyd’s 
notion of natural kinds is widely accepted by many philosophers of emotion (e.g. Griffiths, 1997; 
Prinz, 2004a; Charland, 2002) and emotion scientists (e.g. Barrett, 2006b; Ekman, 1999b; Izard, 
2007).  Second, Griffiths (1997) has argued that defining a natural kind by a homeostatic 
property cluster is ideal for the blurry boundaries of the emotions. “Emotion” is a notoriously 
difficult term to define in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On Boyd’s account this 
need not preclude research on the emotions- it is even a live possibility that “emotion,” like 
“species” must exhibit indeterminacy. Third, most emotion scientists, including Barrett, are 
concerned with classifying emotions in terms of homologues (shared ancestry) rather than 
analogues (similar function). Since the concern is with finding shared ancestry rather than similar 
function, members will not necessarily need to share all the properties.  
Fourth, adopting Boyd’s theory of natural kinds allows scientists to form testable 
hypotheses and evaluate the evidence for these hypotheses. In other words, scientists can form a 
hypothesis that X is a natural kind and test this hypothesis. To test the hypothesis, researchers 
look for a cluster of observable properties with a common underlying causal mechanism. If X 
meets these requirements, then X is a natural kind about which scientifically interesting inductive 
generalizations can be made. The ability to form testable hypotheses, arguably, is what has made 
Boyd’s notion of a natural kind so attractive to scientists, like Barrett who explicitly cites Boyd. 
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Barrett’s arguments are best understood in light of Boyd’s theory because her arguments involve 
a number of scientifically relevant properties and an underlying causal mechanism. These are the 
criteria that she presents for natural kindhood.  
In the next sections of this chapter, I will reconstruct Barrett’s argument that discrete 
emotions are not natural kinds. Then I will lay out her argument that the empirical evidence for 
core affect as a natural kind is suggestive. In order to make the arguments as clear as possible I 
propose a compact summary of Boyd’s core idea and requirements for natural kindhood:  
Core Idea: A kind is natural if and only if its members tend to share a family of co-occurring 
properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence non-
accidentally. 
 
In light of this account, there are two requirements a kind K must satisfy in order to qualify as 
natural: 
 
Requirement 1: There is a family of often co-occurring properties P1….Pn associated with 
instances of K. 
 
Requirement 2: There is a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about the family of 
often co-occurring properties seen in instances of K. 
 
Are discrete emotions natural kinds under this view? Is core affect a natural kind? Barrett 
provides a negative answer to the first questions and a positive answer to the second question. I 
will argue in chapter four that core affect is not a natural kind, but that subsets of core affective 
space may be natural kinds Let us consider her arguments in some detail.  
3.2- Barrett’s Case Against Discrete Approaches to Emotions 
Some discrete emotion theorists, for example Ekman (1999a; 1999b) and Panksepp 
(1998; 2000), have argued that discrete emotions are natural kinds sensu Boyd. The idea is that 
fear, anger, joy, sadness, and so on are natural kinds. Barrett is convinced that the empirical 
evidence does not support the claim that discrete emotions are natural kinds. Barrett concludes 
that the discrete emotions approach has failed to find natural kinds and therefore should be 
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abandoned. She presents core affect as an alternative paradigm that will be more successful in 
finding natural kinds. In what follows I will reconstruct Barrett’s argument that the discrete 
emotions do not fulfill requirements 1 and 2. In evaluating Barrett’s arguments, I will focus 
solely on the disconfirming evidence that she presents and not on the arguments given by 
discrete emotion theorists. 
3.2.1- Do the Discrete Emotions Share Properties? 
There are four shared properties commonly mentioned by discrete emotion theorists 
(especially affect program theorists) as substantiating the view that discrete emotions are natural 
kinds. These are (P1) automatic,22 pan-cultural,23 and primitive24 signature facial expressions for 
each emotion, (P2) the semantic structure of discrete emotion terms as indicated by self-reports, 
(P3) physiological distinctness, and (P4) behavioral distinctiveness. Barrett argues that there is no 
compelling evidence that instances of discrete emotion categories share these properties. The 
consequence is that Barrett thinks, requirement 1, is not meet: There is no family of often co-
occurring properties P1….Pn associated with any discrete emotion. I now turn to a discussion of 
each property.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 In the scientific literature, the term “automatic” is often used to indicate that a given emotion is associated with 
distinct autonomic nervous system reactions. In this thesis I am referring to this as “physical distinctiveness.” By 
“automatic” I mean that the quick on-set of the production of facial expressions and automatic activations of 
attitudes. That is, the accessibility of information in memory that can be called upon immediately in response to an 
emotionally salient stimuli. See Fazio (1986) and Bargh (1992) for more on the topic of the automatic activation of 
attitudes.   
23 In the literature what I am calling pan-cultural is often termed “universal.” If something is universal or pan-
cultural, then it is reliably recognized in all cultures.  
24 In the scientific literature if something is primitive, then it appears in infants and is homologous in other 
mammals.  
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3.2.1.1- Facial Expressions (P1) 
One of the most frequently used methods to study the emotions is to correlate empirical 
data with emotionally salient facial expressions.25 I will begin this section with a general 
discussion of the methodology and goals in the scientific study of facial expressions of emotion, 
which will be relevant throughout the thesis. I will then reconstruct Barrett’s argument that there 
are no signature facial expressions for discrete emotions.  
In general, there are two methodologies in the study of facial expressions of emotions. 
The first, and most commonly used, Barrett calls perception-based studies of the face (2006b, 
37).26 In these studies subjects are presented with pictures of facial expressions of discrete 
emotions and asked to judge which discrete emotion is being portrayed.27 While subjects are 
engaged in this task, certain physiological measurements, such as autonomic nervous system 
reactions28 as well as neural activations, are recorded. The assumption is that in order for 
subjects to exhibit above-chance accuracy at judging the correct discrete emotion portrayed in 
the facial expression they must be able to extract or decode information about the specific 
discrete emotion based on the facial expression. 
                                                 
25 Historically, the scientific desire to find the facial signals of emotions can be traced back to Darwin’s book The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1859), but there has recently been an explosion of empirical work 
specifically on facial signals. This is due to studies conducted in the 1960’s and 1970’s by Ekman (1971) and, 
independently, Izard (1977) where they presented subjects with pictures of emotional facial expressions and asked 
them to identify the corresponding emotion. They found that subjects reliably recognized the facial expressions 
across cultures and even in preliterate cultures with little contact with Western cultures. These findings lead 
scientists, like Ekman and Izard, to claim that these expressions are pancultural, primitive, and automatic. Ekman 
(1976) further mapped out the facial muscles involved in these expressions and formed the Facial Action Coding 
Scheme (FACS), which allows scientists to describe and recognize any facial movement. 
26 This type of study is often termed the “recognition of emotional expressions.”  
27 There are databases of pictures that researchers use that have been tested to show that they are reliably judged by 
subjects as depicting the given emotion. Ekman’s (1976) Facial Action Coding Scheme (FACS) has produced a set 
of pictures of facial expressions of discrete emotions that researchers use. There is also an alternative set of pictures 
that researchers use created by Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (1999) called the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS). These pictures are not of facial expressions per se, but more generally show emotionally evocative events. 
The pictures from the IAPS database are used more frequently in studies that assume a dimensional approach to 
emotions. 
28 See footnote 16 for an explanation of the autonomic nervous system. The central point to keep in mind is that the 
autonomic nervous system is generally not under conscious control and so is thought to provide good evidence for 
an underlying causal mechanism. 
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The second methodology used in studies of facial expressions Barrett calls production-
based studies of the face (2006b, 37). In these sorts of studies, researchers measure the facial 
expressions of the subjects and other physiological responses (such as heart rate) during an 
emotionally evocative event. In order to evoke the emotion, researchers ask subjects to 
remember an emotionally salient event in their lives (for example, the death of a loved one) or 
present subjects with pictures that are emotionally evocative, such as pictures of dead children. 
Throughout the paper I will distinguish between perception-based studies and production-based 
studies to clarify an understanding of the scientific research I am about to present.  
In production-based studies the goal is to map out the specific set of facial muscle 
movements for each discrete emotion and find bodily signatures for them. In perception-based 
studies the goal is to distinguish which discrete emotions are recognized universally across 
cultures (what I will call panculturality) and the physiological responses associated with the 
discrete emotion.29 The general goal of both methodologies is to find facial expressions of 
emotion that are automatic (what I will call automaticity)30 and primitive (what I will call 
primitivity).31 Fulfilling these three criteria -automaticity, panculturality, and primitivity- ensures 
that one’s theory of the emotions meets the rough requirements for a good theory of the emotions 
as introduced at the beginning of chapter two. Panculturality is assumed to demonstrate that the 
emotion is not culturally relative or individualistic. An ideal theory of the emotions would not 
just tell us about an individual’s emotion, but about any individual in any culture. Automaticity 
and primitivity are thought to provide explanations of the emotions wherever they appear, in 
                                                 
29 In other words, in perception-based studies subjects from a wide variety of cultures must be able to accurately 
judge the emotion in the picture and this is assumed to demonstrate that the emotion has an underlying causal 
mechanism.  
30 The extraction or decoding and production of the discrete emotion portrayed in the pictures of facial expressions 
by the subject is thought to take place compulsively and quickly.  
31 The ability to decode or extract this information is thought to be primitive or innate because children and other 
mammals may be able to recognize and/or perform facial expressions of discrete emotions. For example, a primate 
may display a facial expression that is equivalent to a human smile and thus an expression of happiness. 
24 
humans or non-humans, and may indicate that there are homologous structures. Meeting all three 
criteria provide reasons for hypothesizing that there is an underlying causal mechanism for the 
emotion and ensures that the theory meets the criteria for a good theory of the emotions. 
Comparative studies are invaluable to ensure that the theory applies to all individuals that 
experience emotions, especially non-humans. I now turn to Barrett’s argument that discrete 
emotions do not fulfill these criteria.  
3.2.1.1.1- Automaticity 
Production of a facial expression is automatic when it is not under rational control and 
has a quick on-set. For example, a facial expression of fear is automatic if it is produced by the 
subject within a short amount of time absent rational control. Discrete emotion theorists have 
argued that the production of facial expressions corresponding to the discrete emotions takes 
place within around 25 ms (Ekman 1999b). According to Barrett, evidence from animal 
communication research has failed to support this hypothesis. Seyfarth and Cheney (2003) 
showed clearly that nonhuman animals rarely produce involuntary, reflexive displays (Barrett 
2006b, 39). It is not clear if this is really an objection to the claim that the facial expressions of 
discrete emotions have a quick on-set, but given this “evidence” Barrett concludes that 
production of discrete emotion facial expressions are not automatic. Thus, automaticity is not a 
property that can be attributed to discrete emotions as part of the property cluster.   
3.2.1.1.2- Panculturality 
 In addition to the automaticity of facial expressions, discrete emotion theorists claim that 
facial expressions of discrete emotions are pan-culturally recognized (e.g. Izard 1977). Barrett 
rejects this claim. She argues that in perception-based studies of the face there are several factors 
that bias the results- i.e. factors that inflate subjects’ accuracy in ratings of discrete emotion 
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faces. In a meta-review of the empirical literature Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) found that 
accuracy rates reported for each discrete emotion portrayed in the facial expression vary with the 
research team that conducted the study. Barrett attributes this variation to the employment of 
“methods that were more likely to produce large cross-cultural accuracy rates” (Barrett 2006b, 
38). In other words, the results can be attributed to the methodology employed by the 
researchers, not the recognitional abilities of subjects. Three classes of biases artificially raise 
accuracy rates. 
First, there are social biases. Take for example the phenomena known as “in-group 
advantage.” The argument is that “people are generally more accurate at judging emotional 
behaviors depicted by members of their own cultural group than at judging those depicted by 
members of a different cultural group” (2006b, 38). A study by Elfenbein and Ambady (2003), 
found that in-group advantage has significant impact on the accuracy of subjects’ judgments. The 
subjects in Elfenbein’s and Ambady’s study were more accurate at picking out the correct facial 
expression on average by 9.3% if the facial expression was portrayed by a member of their own 
culture. As another example of a social bias, Mesquita (2003) has argued that the task itself is 
highly Westernized task and may not be a valid task for members of non-Western cultures.  
 Second, there are technique biases. Discrete emotion theorists often use short lists of 
terms, creating what Russell calls a “forced-choice method” (1991). The method is “forced” 
because the subjects are not allowed to assign their own terms to the facial expressions, but are 
provided with terms to label the expressions. The method is further “forced” because the terms 
that subjects are given are discrete emotion terms that are already suspected to be pan-cultural. 
Another technique bias is using static, poised expressions that Barrett says “depict caricatures of 
emotion” rather than having subjects judge spontaneous facial movements (2006b, 38). She 
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believes that these caricatures do not reflect the prototypical expression (emoters’ actual 
production of the expression in everyday interactions) and that it “departs from the central 
tendency of its category in a way that will make it maximally distinctive from other categories” 
(Barrett 2006b, 38). In other words, the pictures show exaggerated facial expressions and these 
are different from the expressions seen in everyday life. Thus, subjects’ responses are not 
indicative of the discriminating abilities that we employ in everyday life.  
For example, a prototypical facial expression of anger would depict the expression that is 
seen when an individual is experiencing anger, whereas a caricature facial expression of anger 
would exaggerate the prototypical expression so that it is easier to distinguish and classify from 
other emotions like sadness. “Caricatured stimuli are easier to categorize than prototypic stimuli 
when the categories in question are highly interrelated” (Barrett 2006b, 38). Barrett concludes 
that “the fact that caricatures give the clearest results in emotion-perception studies may be 
indirect evidence that the categories of anger, sadness, fear, and so on are themselves highly 
interrelated without firm boundaries” (Barrett 2006b, 38). In sum, given these issues the claim by 
discrete emotion theorists that the ability to distinguish between these expressions is pan-cultural 
is on poor empirical footing. Therefore, panculturality is not a property that can be attributed to 
discrete emotions as part of the property cluster.          
3.2.1.1.3- Primitivity  
 Discrete emotion theorists have also claimed that facial expressions of discrete emotions 
are primitive (e.g. Ekman 1999b). The ability to discriminate facial expressions is said to be 
primitive if it is exhibited early in development (e.g. by infants) and in non-humans. Barrett 
believes that evidence from developmental psychology calls into question this claim. First, she 
argues that the ability to recognize facial expressions itself (whether they are emotional or not) is 
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not primitive. Infants do not seem to recognize faces as faces. Although infants show a general 
preference for faces, this is arguably due to general perceptual preferences and not due to the 
meaning of the facial expression (for a review see Turati 2004). Second, children categorize 
faces on the basis of simple features of the face like open mouths, or the showing of teeth. In 
several studies, researchers have found that infants cannot distinguish between a smile, 
associated with happiness, that involves the showing of teeth and angry faces that also involve 
the showing of teeth (Caron et al., 1985). According to Barrett, this shows that infants use 
criteria such as teeth to categorize facial expressions rather than by using the emotional meaning 
associated with the face, such as happiness or anger.  
Barrett acknowledges that this objection may be dismissed. It could be the case that the 
recognition of facial expressions of discrete emotions is primitive, but that this ability does not 
materialize at birth. Instead the ability may develop as certain neural systems develop. Even 
though this may be the case, Barrett believes we can at least conclude that infants and children 
do not have the conceptual knowledge needed to recognize facial expressions of discrete 
emotions. In fact, according to a study by Widen and Russell (2003) children do not posses the 
knowledge of emotion concepts until the age of five. Before the age of five children use a few 
emotional terms, like “happy” and “sad,” to describe all emotions and use larger categories like 
“positive” and “negative” to describe emotions in general (Ibid.). Barrett concludes that 
perception based studies of discrete emotion faces demonstrate that the ability to discriminate 
facial expressions of discrete emotions is not primitive. Thus, primitivity is not a property that 
can be attributed to discrete emotions as part of the property cluster. The next property that is 
claimed to be part of the natural property cluster kind of discrete emotions is the semantic 
structure of discrete emotion terms.   
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3.2.1.2- Semantic Structure (P2) 
 Barrett argues that if emotions are best studied as discrete categories, then self-reports of 
emotional experience should exhibit a simple structure (2006b). That is, when subjects are asked 
about their emotional experiences in self-reports, the terms they use to describe these experiences 
should be grouped around discrete categories (fear, anger, happiness, and so on). In other words, 
“measures of emotion experience should produce evidence of discrete, discriminable categories” 
(Barrett 2006b, 35). According to Barrett, evidence of this sort would indicate that reports of any 
given emotion (e.g. sadness) constitute a unified content area (e.g. feelings of sadness) and not 
another content area (e.g. feelings of anger). In addition, if semantic studies showed a consistent 
grouping of discrete categories, this would indicate that the given emotion could not be broken 
down into more basic parts, like valence and arousal. 
 Barrett argues that there is little evidence in self-reports that people classify their 
emotional experience in terms of discrete categories. That is, subjects do not consistently group 
their experience of emotions into discrete units. For example, a number of studies have reported 
that subjects do not consistently group pictures of negative facial expressions, such as disgust, 
fear, and sadness (e.g. Ekman 1971). Reports of negative emotions like fear and sadness are so 
highly correlated that there is often no unique variance to distinguish these discrete emotions. 
Barrett claims that “scales that are explicitly built to measure discrete emotions tend to show 
high correlations between like-valenced states” (2006b, 35). For example, the fact that facial 
expressions of discrete emotions like fear and sadness are not distinguished consistently from 
one another may be explained by the fact that they are both negatively valenced. Barrett 
concludes that there is not a unified, simple semantic structure to discrete emotions terms and 
29 
therefore semantic structure is not a property that can be part of the natural property cluster of 
discrete emotions. 
3.2.1.3- Physiological Distinctness (P3) 
 Since James (1884) proposed that each discrete emotion has a unique bodily pattern, 
researchers have been attempting to identify these signature bodily responses. Researchers are 
primarily concerned with the autonomic nervous system responses because these are generally 
not under conscious control. The assumption is that responses not under conscious control 
demonstrate patterns that have been adaptive and indicate an underlying causal mechanism. 
Several researchers argue that there are distinct bodily responses associated with discrete 
emotions (e.g. Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen, 1983). Barrett believes that studies supporting this 
claim are misleading. She says that “meta-analytic reviews of this literature generally find that 
categories like anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and happiness cannot be fully differentiated by 
autonomic activity alone (Cacioppo et al., 1997; 2000)” (2006b, 41). Discrete emotion theorists 
have similarly reported that subjects have trouble distinguishing between negative emotions, like 
disgust, anger, and fear (e.g. Ekman 1971; Izard 1977).  
 At the same time, Barrett acknowledges that some distinctive differences have been 
found for discrete emotions, but not for most of the discrete emotions. Meta-studies have shown 
that there is a high amount of heterogeneity between the bodily responses recorded for given 
discrete emotions. For example, anger has been found to increase the heart rate in comparison 
with happiness and decrease heart rate in comparison to fear (for a review see Cacioppo et al. 
2000). Thus, there is no characteristic level of heart rate or change in heart rate associated with 
anger. From this and other empirical evidence, Barrett concludes that “such heterogeneity likely 
indicates that unspecified variables are moderating the relations between emotion categories and 
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these peripheral nervous system responses32” (2006b, 41). Barrett believes that these unspecified 
variables are most likely valence and arousal.   
 Barrett also offers alternative explanations for the data supporting distinct physical 
responses associated with discrete emotions. First, vascular patterns that appear to distinguish 
between fear and anger also distinguish between threat and challenge appraisals according to 
several studies (e.g. Blascovich and Mendes 2000). Barrett argues that researchers may 
inadvertently manipulate appraisals of challenge and threat while trying to generate expressions 
of anger and fear. Second, skin conductance responses that appear to configure around discrete 
emotions may be explained by attention allocation, which some studies have shown (e.g. Frith 
and Allen, 1983).    
 A third alternative explanation Barrett provides is that autonomic nervous system 
responses may be in the service of behavior or expected behavior. The appearance of distinct 
physiological response for the discrete emotions may be explained by metabolic demands 
associated with the actual or expected behavior of the given discrete emotion. For example, the 
increased heart rate associated with fear may be due to the expected or actual metabolic demands 
associated with a fight or flight response. Additionally, Barrett claims that a diverse set of 
behaviors are evident for discrete emotions so that there are not behaviors unique to discrete 
emotions like fear. She concludes that “if autonomic activity is in the service of behavior (or 
expected behavior), and if a heterogeneous range of behaviors is associated with a given emotion 
category, then emotion-specific autonomic patterns are unlikely on a priori grounds” (2006b, 41-
42). Instead, the apparent configuration of autonomic nervous system reactions may be due to the 
subjects’ preparation for specific behaviors, rather than the discrete emotion. 
                                                 
32 The peripheral nervous system is the system in which sensory, motor, and autonomic nerves are linked to the 
central nervous system. 
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 Barrett concludes that the evidence for distinct autonomic nervous system responses for 
the discrete emotions is problematic, since there are inconsistent findings across studies and 
alternative explanations have not been ruled out. There does not appear to be a property of 
unique bodily responses associated with each discrete emotion. Therefore, physiological 
distinctiveness is not a property that can be attributed to the discrete emotions as part of the 
property cluster.     
3.2.1.4- Behaviors (P4) 
 The next property that is signature behaviors for each discrete emotion. For example, it 
has been claimed that the behavior associated with anger is attacking or the urge to attack and 
fear is associated with freezing or fleeing or the urge to freeze or flee (Frijda, 1986). Barrett 
claims that signature behaviors are not and cannot be associated with specific discrete emotions. 
Emotions are “specific, context-bound attempts to deal with a situation” and “functional 
demands vary with situations, making it likely that instances of the same emotion can be 
associated with a range of behaviors [instead of a distinct behavior]” (Barrett 2006b, 41). 
 As evidence for the claim that signature behaviors are not observed for each discrete 
emotion, Barrett cites the animal learning literature. Several studies have shown that animal 
behavioral responses correspond to situational demands (e.g. Bouton, 2005). For example, rats 
that are put into a fear situation (that is defined by the presence of a predator) show a range of 
behaviors from orientating their attention to the predator, freezing, jumping, or attacking 
depending on the proximity of the predator (for a review see Bouton, 2005). Barrett concludes 
that behaviors do not group consistently around specific discrete emotions and that many 
different behaviors are associated with many different discrete emotions. Therefore, behavior 
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does not constitute a property that is indicative of each discrete emotion and that can be claimed 
to be part of the natural property cluster kind.  
 In sum, Barrett has argued that the discrete emotions do not fulfill requirement 1 for 
natural kind status. There is no distinct facial expression that is automatic, pan-cultural, and 
primitive for the discrete emotions. Additionally, she argues that there is little evidence for the 
discrete emotions in semantic structure, no distinct physical response for them, and no signature 
behaviors associated with the discrete emotions. Therefore, there is not a cluster of often co-
occurring properties.       
3.2.2- Do the Discrete Emotions Share Causal Mechanisms?  
The causal mechanism that underlies the homeostatic property cluster (requirement 2) of 
each discrete emotion is assumed to be a distinct neural mechanism in the brain.33 Many discrete 
emotion theorists have claimed that discrete emotions have specific neural causes (e.g. Damasio, 
1999; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1993; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998). For example, it has been 
claimed that the basal ganglia is the causal mechanism for disgust. Barrett cites two meta-
analyses of neuroimaging studies of discrete emotions over the past 10 years that do not show 
distinct neural activations corresponding to the discrete emotions (Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et 
al., 2002).34 According to Barrett, these studies found that “unique activation patterns for each 
category of emotion were difficult to discern, and those that materialized were less consistent 
than expected” (2006b, 43). In particular, the meta-reviews showed that there was a wide 
                                                 
33 A causal mechanism can be cashed out in several different ways: as distinct neural circuits, psychological 
mechanisms (e.g. affect programs- Ekman, Izard, Tomkins), cognitive modules (Cosmides and Tooby 2000), 
neurotransmitters, or motivations and it is assumed that all of these options will have some sort of correspondence 
with the brain. A term that is often used when discussing causal mechanisms is “brain markers.” One way of finding 
such a “brain marker,” popular in the literature is to apply neuroimaging techniques (MRI, fMRI, PET) to find 
increased activation. 
34 These meta-reviews included a variety of experimental paradigms, including emotion perception (showing 
subjects pictures of facial expressions of emotions) and emotion induction (where subjects are presented a stimulus 
to induce an emotional state). See Barrett 2006b, 43-45 for a detailed explanation of the meta-reviews. 
33 
divergence between reported neural localizations for anger, happiness, and sadness. I proceed to 
give a particular example that Barrett emphasizes.       
 The meta-reviews reported the most agreement between studies regarding the association 
of fear and the amygdala, but according to Barrett the “correspondences were lower than what 
might be expected if the amygdala represented a core fear system in the brain” (2006b, 43). For 
example, Phan et al. (2002) reported that only 60% of the studies reviewed found increased 
activation in the amygdala in studies involving fear and Murphy et al. (2003) reported that less 
than 40% of the studies reviewed found increased activation in the amygdala in studies involving 
fear. In addition, subjects with amygdala damage can correctly classify facial expressions of fear 
when their attention is directed towards the stimuli (Adolphs et al., 2005) and the amygdala has 
been found to be active in situations that do not involve fear, such as eye gaze (Adams et al., 
2003). It seems there is not a strong association between fear and the amygdala. Thus, Barrett 
claims that the amygdala is likely not the causal mechanism associated with fear.  
Barrett also argues that there are alternative explanations for the apparent association 
between the amygdala and fear. For example, stimulus features such as uncertainty or novelty 
may have produced this correspondence. Similar problems have been observed for other discrete 
emotions and proposed causal mechanisms. Given the empirical evidence and the possibility of 
alternative explanations, Barrett concludes that there is little support for the claim that discrete 
emotions have distinct neural causes and therefore the discrete emotions fail to fulfill 
requirement 2 for natural kind status.  
Let us take stock of the argument so far. Barrett has argued that there is neither a cluster 
of properties associated with discrete emotions, thus failing to fulfill requirement 1, nor a causal 
mechanism associated with them, thus failing to fulfill requirement 2. In particular, there are no 
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facial expressions that are automatic, pan-cultural, and primitive for each discrete emotion, there 
is no evidence of distinct groupings of the semantic terms for discrete emotions, there are not 
unique physical reactions associated with the discrete emotions, and a diverse set of behaviors 
are associated with the discrete emotions. Additionally, there is little to no evidence of a causal 
mechanism for each of the discrete emotions.  
According to core affect theorists, such as Barrett and Russell, one of the main reasons 
that the discrete emotion approach has not established natural kinds is because it uses a folk 
category rather than a scientific one. Now that we have seen Barrett’s argument against the 
natural kind status of discrete emotions, I will turn to the alleged theoretical advantages of core 
affect. 
3.3- Alleged Theoretical Advantages of Core Affect 
The goal of the scientific study of emotion is to find natural kinds about which inductive 
generalizations can be formed. As we just saw, Barrett argues that the empirical evidence does 
not support the thesis that discrete emotions are natural kinds. Core affect theorists believe that 
their theory avoids the problems associated with the discrete emotion approach by proposing a 
more elegant scientific theory. Further, they suggest that the case for core affect as a natural kind 
is more promising than the case for discrete emotions as natural kinds. I will consider these 
alleged theoretical advantages in turn.   
Core affect theorists insist that their theory is more elegant than discrete emotion theories 
for two reasons: it deals with a more basic scientific concept and it is ontologically more 
parsimonious. The basicness of core affect is related to the fact that its components - valence and 
arousal - are simple and fundamental. Core affect theorists claim that valence and arousal cannot 
be captured by a “lower” concept and that they are more fundamental constituents of affective 
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phenomena than discrete emotion categories (Russell 2003). Additionally, many theorists have 
described something along the lines of core affect as a basic psychological process across species 
(for example, Wundt, 1897; Cannon, 1927; Davidson, 2000; Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 
1999).  
Second, core affect is thought to be more ontologically parsimonious because it posits 
fewer theoretical entities than the discrete emotion approach. The discrete emotion approach 
would have us believe that there is a natural kind for each of the discrete emotions. Core affect 
theorists are convinced instead that the affective realm can be further simplified:   
A frugal ontology may be all that is needed: Emotional life consists of the continuous 
fluctuations in core affect, in pervasive perception of affective qualities, and in the 
frequent attribution of core affect to a single Object, all interacting with perceptual, 
cognitive, and behavior processes. Occasionally, these components form one of the 
prototypical patterns [i.e. a prototypical or discrete emotion].35 
 
Simplicity and ontological parsimony are epistemic virtues that any scientific theory tries to 
fulfill. All things being equal, the simpler and more parsimonious theory should be preferred. 
This being said, general epistemic virtues are not what is most important to assess the quality of 
a scientific theory. What matters most is that the theory matches the causal structure of the 
world. Boyd’s account of natural kinds is formulated so that natural kinds are defined as the 
kinds which best conform to the causal structure of the world. If core affect theory were simpler 
and invoked fewer theoretical entities, but performed poorly in its search for natural kinds, it 
would not be preferable. So what is really at issue is the evidence core affect theorists provide in 
support of the thesis that core affect is a natural kind. I will accept for the sake of argument that 
core affect theory is simpler and ontologically more frugal than the discrete emotions, but leave 
this advantage in the background in what follows.  
                                                 
35 Russell 2003, 152. 
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In support of the claim that core affect may be a natural kind, Barrett provides empirical 
evidence that members of the core affective category share a cluster of properties non-
accidentally (thus fulfilling requirement 1) in virtue of a common causal (homeostatic) 
mechanism (thus fulfilling requirement 2). As a result, scientifically interesting generalizations 
can be formed about all instances of core affect. I will now reconstruct Barrett’s argument that 
core affect fulfills each of these requirements. In chapter four I will argue that core affect is not a 
natural kind. I will present some disconfirming data or objections to her arguments here, but my 
argument will be further explained in the subsequent chapter 
3.3.1- Do Instances of Core Affect Share Properties? 
Barrett alleges that the four properties commonly mentioned by discrete emotion theorists 
(those discussed above in chapter 3.2) better-support core affect as a natural kind. These 
properties shared by core affect are: (P1) automatic, pan-cultural, and primitive signature facial 
expressions, (P2) the semantic structure of affective terms, (P3) physiological distinctness, and 
(P4) behavioral distinctiveness. I will now consider the evidence for each and then assess 
whether it supports the case for the natural kind status of core affect.     
3.3.1.1- Facial Expressions (P1) 
As I pointed out in chapter 3.2, there are two general methodologies employed in the 
scientific study of facial expressions of emotion: perception-based studies (examining whether 
subjects can accurately identify emotions in pictures) and production-based studies (examining 
whether subjects produce facial expressions that are signatures of different emotional states). The 
goals of these studies are to find facial expressions of emotions that are automatic, pan-cultural, 
and primitive. Now, do the facial expressions associated with core affect have these 
characteristics? 
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3.3.1.1.1- Automaticity 
Barrett argues that there is evidence for the automaticity of the perception of facial 
expressions associated with core affect. The perception is said to be automatic if it is fast and 
occurs without rational deliberation. Several studies have found that the initial perception of 
valence and arousal in facial expressions takes places within 25 ms of encountering the stimulus 
(Bargh 1997; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, and 
Hymes 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes 1986). Studies are conducted by 
presenting subjects with one stimulus (the primer) and a second stimulus (the target) in short 
time intervals. It is assumed that the recognition of the target as having a certain property, such 
as valence, in short time intervals indicates that a minimal amount of rational deliberation is 
involved, thus, providing evidence for automaticity. Other studies have shown that faces of 
positive versus negative emotional states that are presented subliminally influence subsequent 
judgments of the valenced value of ambiguous stimuli, whereas supralimnal presentations did 
not (Murphy and Zajonc 1993). In other words, the subjects’ perception of the target is 
influenced by the primer only when the target and primer are presented in short time periods and 
not in longer time periods. This seems to indicate that the perception of facial expressions of core 
affect are automatic.  
However, such findings depend on specific primers and on the strength of the association 
of the primer with the target. As Fazio et al. note “the present findings regarding attitude 
activation following repeated expression can be attributed to the resulting strength of the object- 
evaluation association and not to the extremity of the associated stimuli” (1986, 235). In fact, 
there was only an automatic association when primers were followed by the same type of target, 
so that the automatic association only appeared when, for example a positively valenced primer 
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was followed by a positively valenced target. In trials where they presented subjects with, for 
example a negative primer followed by a positive primer, the subjects did not automatically 
choose the correct valenced dimension. Additionally, these studies have been critiqued because 
the subjects were asked to memorize the primer and therefore may have been consciously 
assessing the target, rather than automatically associating the primer and the target. However, in 
later studies (such as Bargh et al. 1996) subjects did not memorize the primer, and there 
remained a high correspondence between presentation of the valenced primer and subjects’ 
ability to categorize the valenced target,36 but only when the valence was the same. Therefore, 
facial expressions of core affect appear to be automatic. 
3.3.1.1.2- Panculturality 
Second, there have been studies that Barrett claims show that facial expressions of core affect 
are pancultural. Some studies on facial expressions of core affect have asked people to choose 
dimensions rather than discrete emotions that correspond to the expression; “two 
multidimensional-scaling studies of the feelings conveyed by facial expressions both yielded the 
same pleasure and arousal dimension in different languages” (Russell 1991., 439). For example, 
studies in Japanese and English (Osaka, 1986), in Greek, Chinese and English (Russell et al., 
1989), in Greek (Triandis and Lambert, 1958.), and in Dutch (Frijda, 1953) all show that subjects 
group the expressions consistently around the same level of pleasure and arousal. In other words, 
subjects reliably discern the location of the facial expressions of core affect on the circumplex. 
As an example, subjects rate facial expressions corresponding to “lethargic” and “depressed” as 
negatively valenced and not highly arousing. Further, “no one has yet shown any influence of 
                                                 
36 The consistency was statistically more significant (ranging from 100% to 97%) when there was a strong 
association between the primer and the target. When there was a weak correspondence the consistency was still 
statistically significant, but was much lower (ranging from 87% to 73%) (Bargh et al. 1996, 115). 
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language or culture on the nature of the dimensions found in these studies” (Russell 1991, 440). 
This seems to indicate that perception of facial expressions of core affect is pan-cultural. 
These studies are compelling, but there are fewer studies that focus on dimensions rather than 
discrete emotions and in addition it seems that no one has done a study on a preliterate, isolated 
culture. The lack of data from a preliterate, isolated culture is necessary because it could be 
objected that the consistency in ratings of facial expressions and core affective levels is due to 
cultural influence and not due to some innate mechanism. This was an important critique of the 
basic emotions theory and a study conducted by Ekman (1971) showed that even people in 
isolated, preliterate societies could correctly identify the facial expressions with the 
corresponding emotion. Thus this is an objection that core affect theorists will need to address. 
3.3.1.1.3- Primitivity  
Third, there is evidence that facial expressions of core affect are primitive. Core affect 
theorists claim that we are born with the ability to feel pleasure and displeasure. There is much 
evidence that babies can feel pleasure and displeasure in the psychological literature (e.g., Emde, 
1976, Osgood, 1975; Spitz, 1965, Sroufe, 1979) and that they communicate these feelings 
through facial expressions. Infants express negative affect through distinct facial expressions 
(Camras, 1992; Camras, Oster, Campos, & Bakemand, 2003) or in terms of arousal (Messenger, 
2002).  
In addition to the production-based studies on infants, there is also evidence from studies 
on children. Children discriminate and label faces largely on the basis of valence and arousal 
(Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1985, 1986; Hosie, Gray, Russell, Scott, & Hunter, 1998; Russell & 
Bullock, 1986). So, there appears to be evidence from both production and perception-based 
studies of facial expressions that children produce and recognize facial expressions of core 
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affect. Therefore, facial expressions of core affect appear to be primitive because there is 
evidence that infants and children produce and perceive facial expressions of emotions in terms 
valence and arousal.  
What is missing from this story is a connection with animal studies, as Panksepp (2007) 
rightly points out. If emotions emerge from valence and arousal, then there should be evidence in 
studies conducted on animals. Panksepp states that it is not clear if core affect is only supposed 
to underwrite emotional expression found in humans and not in non-humans.37 If facial 
expressions of core affect are only applicable to humans, then I think the evidence given does 
support the claim that facial expressions of core affect are primitive. But Russell claims that core 
affect is a biological product of evolution, in part to prepare for action and influence behavioral 
choices, suggesting that there may be homologues in non-humans (2003, 156). If facial 
expressions of core affect do have homologues, then the claim that core affect is a natural kind 
may be difficult to prove because it is not clear how scientists would go about studying the facial 
expressions of core affect in non-human animals. Core affect theorists recognize the need for 
evidence of this sort (Barrett 2007c). 
3.3.1.2- Semantic Structure  
According to Russell and Barrett, the semantic structure of core affective terms, as judged by 
subjects in self-reports, group consistently around levels of valence and arousal. Russell says 
“part of the meaning of all mood and emotion-related words in any language can be summarized 
by these two underlying dimensions [valence and arousal]” (2003, 153). Anna Wierzbicka 
(1999) has found that all human languages have phrases that roughly translate as “I feel good” 
and “I feel bad.” This suggests that the concepts of feel, good, and bad are recognized cross-
                                                 
37 This is a problem for core affect theorists because as I argued in chapter 2.3 valence and arousal have not been 
clearly defined. The phenomenological notion of valence and arousal seem to exclude non-humans or at least it is 
not clear how researchers would go about studying valence and arousal in this sense in non-humans.  
41 
culturally, which supports the claim that valence, at least, may have such a semantic role. 
Additionally, Russell argues that arousal is also “likely [a] universal semantic dimension of 
emotion” (2003, 153). In support of the claim that valence and arousal are pancultural, Barrett 
(1995, 53) states:  
The two dimensions have been identified in the semantic structure of affective terms and 
together typically account for a substantial amount of variance in self-reports of affective 
experience. Previous research has suggested that the dimensions represent the semantic 
components that individuals use to interpret and communicate their conscious, affective 
experience.   
 
Below is a semantic based circumplex from studies that asked subjects to judge the levels of 
arousal and valence for affective terms like “nervous” and “happy.” Subjects were asked 
questions like whether “nervous” and “afraid” were similarly valenced and arousing, and 
subjects responded that they were. Subjects were also asked if “disappointed” and “satisfied” 
were similarly valenced and arousing, and subjects responded that they were not. This semantic 
based circumplex supports the core affect circumplex as a reliable projection of the affective 
space.  
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The circumplex above provides good reasons for thinking that subjects categorize 
emotions in terms of core affect, but the subjects in these studies were all from Western cultures. 
A good theory of the emotions must be able to account for emotions across cultures and people. 
Barrett does cite one scientific study that she claims supports the cross-cultural grouping of core 
affect (Mesquita, 2003). Upon further inspection, though, Mesquita is concerned with providing 
a cultural model for the emotions that is consistent with the basic emotions theory.38 She says 
that “some of these responses [facial expressions, peripheral nervous system responses, etc.] are 
demonstrably hardwired, but others may be socially learned” (2003, 887). If core affect is 
socially learned, then the theory will not apply to all cultures and humans. Therefore, reliable 
generalizations regarding the core affective category will not be forthcoming.  
 3.3.1.3- Physiological Distinctness 
In addition to evidence from facial expressions and the semantic structure of affective 
terms, Barrett claims that there are distinct autonomic nervous system responses for core 
affective states (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Lang et al., 1993). For example, negative affect is 
associated with higher diastolic blood pressure, increased heart rate, and decreases in 
electrodermal response duration. These measures are relative to positive affect and contrastive 
properties are seen for negative affect. So, whereas negative affect is associated with higher 
blood pressure and decreased electrodermal responses, positive affect is associated with 
decreases in blood pressure and heart rate and increases in electrodermal response duration. 
There are additional studies that she claims show that core affect involves distinct peripheral 
                                                 
38 “The very course of emotions- the ways in which the potential of emotions is realized- appears to differ as a 
function of cultural models. Culture is, therefore, not spoiling or distracting from the basic theory of emotions, as 
has long been assumed. Rather, it should be considered a necessary aspect of emotion theory. Basically, emotions 
are cultural, even though that is not the only thing they are” (Mesquita 2003, 887). 
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nervous system responses (Cacioppo et al., 1997, 2000; Bradley & Lang, 2000). Therefore, 
Barrett argues that there are distinct physical reactions associated with core affect.  
One objection to the claim that core affective states have distinctive physiological signatures 
is that all of these studies were done on humans. Again, a good theory of the emotions should be 
able to explain emotional phenomena wherever it is present and many people would argue that 
animals experience emotions. Thus, the distinctive physiological signatures found in humans, 
must also be found in animals, or an argument must be provided for why the physiological 
measurements of animals do not matter. Additionally, Panksepp (2007) notes that if core affect 
better explains affective states than discrete emotion approaches, then core affective theorists 
need evidence to explain away the evidence from animals given by the discrete emotion theorists 
3.3.1.4- Behaviors 
According to Barrett, voluntary actions, behaviors, or action tendencies (readiness to 
achieve or maintain a particular sort of relationship with the environment) are distinct for core 
affect. There is evidence from scientific studies that some behaviors can be considered 
expressive, in the sense that organisms’ behaviors are indicative of its core affective states. For 
example, Cacioppo and Gardner (1999) argue that approach behavior indicates positive valence 
and withdrawal behavior indicate negative valence. Additionally, valence and arousal have been 
used to explain diverse sets of behaviors (see Russell 2003 for a review). The experience of 
negatively valenced states over prolonged periods of times has been used to explain 
psychological problems involving sex (Abramson & Ponkerton 1995), drug abuse (R.L. Solomon 
1977), aggression (Berkowitz 1993), and eating (Pinel, Assanand & Lehman 2000). While an 
understanding of core affect may contribute to explanations for behaviors and help an individual 
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to identify the emotional state of another, there is no evidence that there are unique behaviors 
that correspond to core affective states.  
3.3.2- Do Instances of Core Affect Share a Causal Mechanism?  
Lastly, Barrett provides some reason to think that there is an underlying causal 
mechanism to core affective states and believes that this is the strongest evidence for core affect 
as a natural kind. There may also be a neurotransmitter associated with core affect. Barrett says 
that “the dopamine system in the nucleus accumbens is associated with negative affective 
motivational states more broadly (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Reynolds & Berridge, 2002, 
2003)” (Barrett 2006b, 45). Core affect theorists claim that areas of activation in the brain during 
emotional episodes coincide with areas of activation for valence and arousal, which would 
indicate a neurobiological substrate or brain marker for core affect (Panksepp 2000; Bradley & 
Lang 2000; Cacioppo et al. 1997, 2000; Wagner et al. 2003). Barrett states that “neural 
activations provide a strong empirical basis for hypothesizing that a general affect system 
constitutes the most basic building block of emotional life” (2006b, 49). Finding such a brain 
marker for core affect would explain the causal mechanism that underlies the category and 
provide evidence for the claim that core affect constitutes a natural kind.39  
Barrett relies heavily on two meta-analyses of emotion research (Phan, et al 2001 & 
Wager, et al 2003). The meta-analysis by Wager reviewed 65 PET and fMRI studies of 
emotional tasks. The meta-analysis by Phan reviewed 55 PET and fMRI studies of emotional 
tasks. Barrett claims that these studies give us a starting point in analyzing the data collected to 
see if core affect does constitute a natural kind and that their findings support the claim that there 
may be a brain marker for core affect. She claims that “both analyses observed greater left-sided 
                                                 
39 I should emphasize that the neurobiological information for this only provides a preliminary sketch of very broad 
brain areas. No one has yet been able to causally reduce any emotional experiences to neurobiological processes. 
(Barrett 2006b) 
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activations (left-lateralization) for approach- (vs. withdrawal) related affect” (2006c, 81). This 
would indicate that there may be a brain marker for at least the valence dimension.40 When 
examining the empirical evidence for the arousal dimension, she admits that the evidence is less 
clear. In fact she believes that the causal mechanism underlying core affect has yet to be fully 
analyzed, but that from these meta-analyses we can at least draw a tentative conclusion that core 
affect activates particular areas of the brain, indicating that there is an underlying causal 
mechanism. In addition, the core affect theorists claim that there is evidence that psychological 
disorders arise from or are associated with brain areas relevant to core affect (Barlow 2002; 
Hariri & Holmes 2006; Hariri et al. 2005). I will now assess the evidence in more detail.  
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING CORE AFFECT 
 Now that we have considered Barrett’s arguments against the natural kind status of 
discrete emotions and for the natural kind status of core affect we are finally in a position to 
address the central question of this thesis: Is core affect a natural kind? In this chapter I will 
argue that, contra Barrett (2006), the evidence does not suggest that core affect is a natural kind. 
Before doing so, I want to remind the reader of what it takes to be a natural kind sensu Boyd (see 
section 3.1 for a more detailed analysis). Here is a compact summary of Boyd’s core idea:  
A kind is natural if and only if its members tend to share a family of co-occurring properties 
and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence non-
accidentally. 
 
In light of this account, there are two requirements a kind K must satisfy in order to qualify 
as natural: 
 
Requirement 1: There is a family of often co-occurring properties P1….Pn associated with 
instances of K. 
 
                                                 
40 I am glossing over some issues regarding the different dimensional approaches. I am here assuming that the 
approach dimension is related to the valence dimension (see Ch. 2), but only because Wager states that the “valence 
results were very similar to those for approach/withdraw.” (520) I assume this is also why Barrett includes it in her 
work. (2007b) 
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Requirement 2: There is a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about the family of 
often co-occurring properties seen in instances of K. 
 
In section 3.2 I considered Barrett’s argument that the discrete emotions do not satisfy 
requirements 1 and 2. In section 3.3 I introduced her reasons to think that core affect does fulfill 
requirements 1 and 2. In the next section I will argue that despite Barrett’s arguments to the 
contrary, core affect does not appear to fulfill requirements 1 and 2.  
4.1- The Status of Core Affect as a Natural Kind 
Barrett’s key hypothesis on core affect is the following: 
The empirical case supporting the hypothesis that core affect is a natural kind is 
suggestive (Barrett 2006b, 48).  
Since core affect is a combination of valence and arousal, this hypothesis appears to suggest 
three things. Firstly, that valence is a natural kind. Secondly, that arousal is a natural kind. 
Thirdly, that the combination of valence and arousal – core affect - is a natural kind. In the 
subsequent sections of this chapter, I will argue that valence is not likely to be a natural kind 
(4.1.2), that arousal is not likely to be a natural kind (4.1.3), and that core affect is not likely to 
be a natural kind (4.1.4). In 4.1.5 I will argue that even though core affect may not be a natural 
kind, four potential candidates for natural kind status can be located in subsets of core affect.  
4.1.2- Is Valence a Natural Kind? 
Valence, as represented by the horizontal axis of the circumplex, ranges on a continuum 
from positive to negative. In order to claim that valence is a natural kind it would need to be the 
case that all instances ranging from positively to negatively valenced would tend to share a 
family of co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their 
co-occurrence non-accidentally. As I will demonstrate below, the empirical evidence does not 
support the case that the class of all valenced states constitutes a natural kind. The evidence 
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supports splitting valence into two groups corresponding to the extremes of the valence 
continuum: positive valence and negative valence. Contra Barrett, the empirical evidence 
suggests that positive valence and negative valence may constitute distinct natural kinds (I will 
return to the consequences of this point in 4.1.4 and 4.1.5).  
The empirical evidence provided below will suggest that there are diverse causal 
mechanisms underlying positive valence and negative valence. If this is the case, then valence 
does not fulfill requirement 2. There also appear to be distinct properties clustered around each 
type of valence, showing that valence does not fulfill requirement 1 either. Thus, valence does 
not seem to meet the requirements for natural kindhood because it is too heterogeneous and does 
not conform to the causal structure of the world. It should be noted that the scientific studies I am 
about to discuss contrast these two extremes and the properties that are measured are thus 
relational.41 I will begin by looking at the evidence for a cluster or properties for valence and 
then examine the empirical data for a causal mechanism for valence. 
4.1.2.1- Shared Properties?  
There are four contrastive pairs of properties that are associated with positive valence and 
negative valence and thus not with valence as an entire class. These properties involve facial 
expressions, physiological distinctness, behaviors, and effects on the health of subjects. The 
shared properties fulfill requirement 1, but only for the extremes of valence and not for valence 
                                                 
41 I would like to briefly remind the reader of the methodology employed in these studies that was discussed in 3.2 
and emphasize that these extremes (positive and negative valence/high and low arousal (discussed in the preceding 
section) are contrasted. Most of the studies use facial expressions or other pictures that are emotionally salient 
(either production-based studies or perception-based studies), measure certain data, and correlate these findings with 
self-reports in order to ensure that the subjects agree that the pictures represent the specific emotion state that they 
are supposed to represent. For example, subjects may be asked to view pictures depicting negative emotional 
expressions or states and positive emotional expressions or states. The measured data collected is correlated with 
self-reports and contrasted between positive and negative emotionally relevant states. For example, while viewing a 
negative emotional expression blood pressure increases in subjects in relation to the blood pressure of subjects 
viewing positive emotional expressions. Thus the reader should keep in mind that these properties are all relational 
properties. The same applies to high and low arousal states.  
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as a class. So there appears to be evidence that positive valence may be a natural kind and that 
negative valence may be another natural kind. I will now consider evidence which suggests this 
split of the valence category into two distinct natural kinds.    
First, production-based facial studies have consistently shown that positively valenced 
emotions and negatively valenced emotions activate different facial muscles. Positively valenced 
emotions elicit more activation in the cheek region, specifically increased zygomatic (smile 
muscle) activity, as measured by facial electromyogram (EMGs).42 In contrast, the same 
production-based facial studies have consistently shown that negatively valenced emotions show 
increased activation in the brow area (Cacioppo et al. 2000, 178-179) and the corrugator (frown) 
muscle. These heterogeneous and contrasting properties for positive valence and negative 
valence are observed while subjects are thinking about past experiences (i.e., in production-based 
studies) and while viewing pictures of positive emotional expressions (i.e., in perception-based 
studies) (Fridlund et al. 1984; Lang et al. 1993; Schwartz et al. 1980. For a review of the 
empirical studies see Cacioppo et al. 2000, 177-179). Production-based studies on infants show 
the same diverse facial muscle activation for positively valenced and negatively valenced 
emotions during emotionally salient stimuli. One study looked at infant cry-faces and infant 
smile-faces (Messinger 2002). Messinger found that the same facial muscles that are activated in 
adults are activated in infants. That is, cry-faces elicit more activation in the corrugator muscle 
and smile-faces elicit more activation in the zygomatic muscle. These diverse activations for 
positively valenced facial expressions and negatively valenced facial expressions, seen both in 
adults and infants, suggest that valence as a class is too heterogeneous to constitute a natural 
kind. Each type of valence appears to have its own distinct observable properties, in terms of 
                                                 
42 EMGs record electrical currents associated with muscle contractions. Scientists have detailed maps of the facial 
muscles. See Ekman 1976.  
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facial expressions. So, just as there is no face of anger, there is no face of a valenced state 
simpliciter. At most the evidence suggests that there may be a face of a negatively valenced state 
and another face of a positively valenced state.  
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that physical distinctness, defines as reactions in 
the autonomic nervous system, is only found at the extremes of positive valence and negative 
valence (not the entire class of valence). For example, during viewings of pictures that express 
positively valenced emotions, there is a general decrease in autonomic nervous system activity 
(Cacioppo et al. 2000, 183), although greater peak heart rate acceleration has been observed 
(Bradley and Lang 2000).43 In contrast, the same studies found that there is greater autonomic 
activity when subjects view pictures representative of negatively valenced emotions, combined 
with significant heart rate deceleration. Notice that, as we saw above in the case of facial 
expressions, autonomic nervous system reactions and measurements in cases of negative versus 
positive valence form a contrastive pair. Once again, it seems that positively-valenced and 
negatively-valenced states are too heterogeneous to form a single natural kind. 
Other studies on the distinctness of valence show similarly diverse reactions. When 
scientists measure blink responses in subjects viewing pictures of positively valenced emotional 
states, the number of blink responses decreases and quicker eye blinks are recorded (Lang et al. 
1993; Bradley and Lang 2000). Again, the same studies show a contrastive reaction in the eye 
movements of subjects viewing pictures depicting negatively valenced emotional states. When 
subjects view pictures of negative expressions, the number of blink responses increases and 
slower eye blinks are recorded. Again, the evidence suggests that the properties are contrastive 
                                                 
43 Bradley and Lang (2000) note that “as an index of emotional state, cardiac rate is less straightforward than other 
psychological measures.” See page 258 of their article for a detailed discussion of this point. 
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between negative and positive valence. There are no characteristic properties of valence as a 
class. 
Third, subjects exhibit distinct behavioral reactions to positively valenced emotions and 
different behavioral reactions to negatively valenced emotions. For example, one study found 
that subjects rate pictures depicting positive emotional states as more interesting than pictures 
depicting negative emotional states (Lang et al. 1993). The same study observed that, despite 
this, subjects chose to view the pictures depicting positive states in shorter time periods and the 
pictures depicting negative states for longer time periods. Other studies have found that subjects 
shown pictures depicting negative emotional states show greater attention to them than to 
pictures depicting positive emotional states (Pratto and John 1991; Hansen and Hansen 1988). 
This means that subjects exhibit more orienting behaviors to pictures of negative emotional 
states than to pictures of positive emotional states. Once again, it appears that the properties do 
not cluster for valence as a class, but for the extremes of the continuum.  
Fourth, there are increased health benefits associated with positively valenced emotions 
and decreased health benefits associated with negatively valenced emotions. Many studies have 
found that individuals who describe experiencing mostly positively valenced emotions in their 
daily lives live longer than those who report experiencing mostly negatively valenced emotions 
(e.g. Swenson et al., 1973; Herbert & Cohen, 1993; Kiecolt-Glaser et al, 1996; Lyubomirsky et 
al., 2005; Maruta et al., 2000). A study that examined the diaries of nuns, looking for positive 
and negative emotional terms, found that those who used more positive terms lived longer than 
those who used more negative terms (Danner et al., 2001). Another study found that the way 
men described bad emotional experiences (either in positive or negative terms), predicted their 
future health states. They found that those who described their experiences in positive terms 
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were healthier later in life than those who described their experiences in negative terms (Peterson 
et al., 1998). In a meta-review of the relation between positively valenced emotions and health 
benefits, Lyubomirsky et al. conclude that “our review of the cross-sectional empirical literature 
suggests that happiness [defined as positive valence] is positively correlated with indicators of 
superior mental and physical health” (2005, 825). One more time, the evidence suggests that 
there are contrasting health benefits for the extremes of valence. 
To summarize, the empirical evidence from facial expression studies, physical 
distinctness, behaviors, and effects on health implies that valence is too heterogeneous to be a 
natural kind sensu Boyd. Even though ‘valenced states’ is not a homogenous kind, the classes of 
‘negatively valenced’ and ‘positively valenced’ states may be. If X is positively valenced, X will 
tend to promote health effects, activate certain facial muscles, result in distinct behaviors, and 
have signature responses in the body. On the other hand, if X is negatively valenced, X will tend 
to promote negative health effects, activate certain (distinct) facial muscles, result in distinct 
behaviors, and have signature responses in the body. In sum, the evidence suggests there is one 
cluster of properties associated with positive valence, and another, distinct, even contrastive 
cluster of properties associated with negative valence. But a cluster of properties is only half of 
the story for being a natural kind a la Boyd. The key to a homeostatic property cluster is a causal 
mechanism. I now turn to examine the empirical evidence for a causal mechanism underlying 
valence. 
4.1.2.2- Shared Causal Mechanism? 
Empirical data suggests that there are different causal (homeostatic) mechanisms for 
positive valence and negative valence. As I will show, these causal (homeostatic) mechanisms 
appear to be contrastive, just as the properties above were. So there do appear to be reasons to 
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think that positive and negative valence fulfill requirement 2, but not the entire class of valenced 
states. Once more, valence appears to be too heterogeneous to form a natural kind, but the 
extremes may constitute natural kinds.   
In emotion theory the assumption is that a causal mechanism for emotions will be found 
in the brain. We lack robust empirical evidence concerning causal mechanisms for positive 
valence and negative valence, but it should be noted that discrete emotion theorists have likewise 
failed to find strong correlations between individual types of discrete emotions and specific 
processes in the brain. Even though there is not a distinct brain area that we can call the causal 
mechanism for positive valence and negative valence, there is some general evidence that we can 
point to. Many studies have correlated positive valence with increased left-hemisphere activation 
and negative valence with increased activation in the right hemisphere. Cacioppo et al. states that 
most studies have found that “the left anterior region of the brain appears to be involved in the 
expression and experience of approach-related emotion [positive valence], and the right anterior 
region appears to be involved in the expression and experience of avoidance-related emotions 
[negative valence]” (2000, 185). The evidence for diverse causal mechanisms for positive and 
negative valence suggests that all valenced states are too heterogeneous to constitute a natural 
kind, but these extremes may be homogenous enough.  
For example, a number of studies using electroencephalographic (EEG)44 recordings of 
subjects during viewings of emotionally salient film clips have found that positive reactions (as 
indicated by self-reports) to positively valenced films are correlated with activity in the left-
hemisphere. The same studies found that negative reactions to negatively valenced films were 
correlated with right-hemisphere activation (Cacioppo et al. 2000). Additionally, clinical 
observations (Robinson et al. 1984; Robinson & Downhill 1995) and experimental research 
                                                 
44 EEGs record electrical activity in the brain by using sensors, called electrodes, attached to the subject’s head. 
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suggest that individual differences in the activation of the left-hemisphere result in a 
predisposition to experience positive emotions and individual differences in the activation of the 
right-hemisphere result in a predisposition to experience negative emotions (Cacioppo et al. 
2000, 185). Clinical observations also support the right lateralization for negatively valenced 
emotions. One study found that a patient who had undergone a right temporal lobectomy 
responded just as a normal patient would to positive stimuli, but not to negative stimuli (Morris 
et al. 1991).45  While these are extremely general, they at least point to diverse causal 
mechanisms. 
Given the current empirical data the most that we can say is that increased activation in 
the left-hemisphere appears to be correlated with positive valence, and increased activation in the 
right-hemisphere appears to be correlated with negative valence. Even though the evidence does 
not show a robust causal mechanism for either positive valence or negative valence, it does 
suggest that there may be diverse causal mechanisms for the class of valence. Thus, it appears 
that all valenced states do not fulfill requirement 2 for natural kindhood, but the extremes of 
positive and negative may fulfill this requirement. I will now examine the evidence for the 
natural kind status of the other dimension of core affect: arousal.  
4.1.3- Is Arousal a Natural Kind? 
Arousal, as represented along the vertical axis of the circumplex, is a continuum from high 
levels to low levels. I now consider the hypothesis that all aroused states (ranging from high to 
low) tend to share a family of often co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) 
mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence non-accidentally. I will suggest that the 
                                                 
45 This was found not only in measurements while the subject was viewing negative pictures, but also was reported 
by the patient’s family and friends. 
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evidence points to a split within the arousal dimension, analogously to the case of valence. The 
evidence suggests that high arousal and low arousal may be distinct natural kinds.  
It should be noted that it is difficult to evaluate the natural kind status of arousal. There are 
several reasons for this. First, it is difficult to precisely define “arousal” as I argued in section 
2.3. Arousal is most often thought of and measured by reactions in the autonomic nervous 
system, but the effects of the autonomic nervous system are far-ranging. Due to the far-ranging 
effects, it seems that there may be alternative explanations for these visceral properties that need 
to be eliminated. Barrett admits to this: “Patterns of autonomic and somatic responses relate in 
some way to feeling active and alert, slowed down and sleepy, or angry or sad, but there is no 
simple, one-to-one correspondence” (2004b, 685).  It is important for scientists to keep in mind 
that if they want to find natural kinds they need to precisify their terms. According to Boyd, 
“natural kinds are solutions…to problems about how to sort things so as to facilitate reliable 
induction and explanation” (1999, 72). In order to accomplish this, the categories must be 
revised to fit the causal structure of the world. Second, there are few studies solely on arousal, 
whereas there are a plethora of studies on valence. Lastly, there are problems with identifying a 
causal mechanism for arousal.  
The empirical evidence which is available suggests that the entire class of arousal is not a 
natural kind. Similarly to valence, arousal appears to split into two possible natural kinds (the 
extremes): high arousal and low arousal. The evidence I elucidate below suggests that there are 
clusters of distinct properties for high and low arousal, but not for the entire class of arousal. 
Therefore, arousal does not fulfill requirement 1. The evidence for a causal mechanism 
underlying arousal is sketchy at best, but I will suggest that there are reasons to think that there 
may be two underlying causal mechanisms in the category. Therefore, arousal does not appear to 
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fulfill requirement 2. Again, I will return to what this might imply about the natural kind status 
of core affect in 4.1.4 and 4.1.5. 
4.1.3.1- Shared Properties?  
There appear to be at least three contrastive pairs of properties for high arousal and low 
arousal, but no properties shared by the entire class. These properties are facial expressions, 
physical distinctness, and behaviors. These properties support requirement 1 for natural 
kindhood, but only for the extremes: high arousal and low arousal. I will present the empirical 
evidence for each of these properties below. 
First, there is evidence that when a positively or negatively valenced emotion is viewed the 
level of tension in the relevant facial muscle group is related to the level of arousal. In other 
words, higher levels of arousal correspond to greater tension in the relevant muscles, depending 
on whether the emotion is positively or negatively valenced (Cacioppo et al. 1986). In particular, 
zygomatic (smile muscle) activity increases as arousal increases in viewings of emotionally 
positive pictures (Lang et al. 1993). Cacioppo et al. conclude that “the present research indicates 
that facial EMG activity varies as a function of…the intensity of affective reactions” (1986, 266). 
Messinger (2002) believes that his data on facial expression in infants also indicate that high 
arousal corresponds to stronger contraction of the associated facial muscles. These empirical data 
seem to indicate that high levels and low levels of arousal have characteristic effects that are 
contrastive and therefore arousal as a whole is too heterogeneous to be a natural kind. 
Second, there is evidence that physiological responses are distinct for levels of arousal. 
For example, skin conductance responses determined by activity in the sweat glands increase as 
arousal increases, regardless of whether the emotionally salient pictures are rated as positive or 
negative (Lang et al. 1993; Bernstein 1969; Maltzman et al. 1971; Bradley et al. 1990; Cook et 
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al. 1991; Greenwald et al. 1989; Manning & Melchiori 1974; Winton et al. 1984). In other 
words, subjects produce more sweat when highly aroused and less sweat when they are in states 
of low arousal. Lang et at. conclude that “skin conductance response increased monotonically 
with ranked arousal” (1003, 265). Again, there appear to be contrastive properties associated 
with levels of arousal.  
Third, there are distinct behavioral responses correlated with high arousal and contrasting 
responses to low arousal. For example, measures of attention, leading to orienting behaviors, are 
related primarily to arousal levels (Lang et al. 1993). Subjects tend to exhibit orienting behaviors 
to highly arousing emotional stimuli. Additionally, Bradley et al (1992) showed that memory is 
better for pictures that are rated as highly arousing.46 Gold and McGaugh’s (1975) study also 
supports the claim that memory increases for highly arousing stimuli. Gold and McGaugh 
manipulated arousal levels in animal subjects and showed that they also demonstrated better 
memory of training stimuli when the arousal levels were high. These properties are once again 
clustered around the extremes of arousal and not arousal as a whole. Even though arousal states 
are not homogeneous, high arousal and low arousal may be. In sum, the limited empirical data 
suggest that the extremes of arousal may each be associated with a distinct cluster of properties 
and may therefore be natural kinds. Again, the causal (homeostatic) mechanism is key and so I 
turn to that requirement below. 
4.1.3.2- Shared Causal Mechanism?  
Causal mechanisms related to arousal are much more difficult to distinguish, but given 
what was said in the previous section, it seems likely that there are (at least) two distinct causal 
mechanisms at work in the category of arousal. One study did find that a patient who had 
                                                 
46 It should be noted that this is not the case for pathologically fearful subjects. When these subjects are highly 
aroused they have poor memories. 
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portions of the right amygdala removed consistently reported lower arousal levels (Bradley and 
Lang 2000, 259). So it might be the case that the right hemisphere is correlated with arousal, but 
this is a tentative conclusion.  
The problem with finding a causal mechanism might be attributed to the fact that 
scientists are not looking for the right kind of causal mechanism. Causal mechanisms are 
assumed to be found in regions or areas in the brain, but there may be good reasons to think that 
this will not be the case for arousal. All of the measurable effects associated with arousal involve 
visceral properties and the effects are diverse and widespread. Given such diverse effects it 
seems unlikely that one brain area or region would be correlated with arousal. It may be the case 
that scientists need to search for a causal mechanism for arousal at a different level of analysis.  
Perhaps the causal mechanism for arousal is better thought of as a change in hormone levels or 
neurotransmitters. Further empirical research needs to be done, but if clusters of properties are 
indicative of an underlying causal mechanism (this is usually assumed to be the case), then in all 
likelihood there are different causal mechanism for high and low arousal. 
To summarize, the limited empirical data suggest that arousal is too heterogeneous to be 
a natural kind. Instead, homogeneity appears at the extremes of high arousal and low arousal.  If 
X is a high arousal state, then X will tend to exhibit increased tension in facial muscles, 
increased production in the sweat glands, and orientating behavior. On the other hand, if X is a 
low arousal state, then X will tend to exhibit decreased tension in facial muscles, decreased 
production in the sweat glands, and less orientating behavior. Thus, high arousal and low arousal 
may both constitute natural kinds, but the evidence suggests that arousal as an entire class does 
not. 
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4.1.4- Is Core Affect a Natural Kind? 
 I have now evaluated whether valence and arousal are natural kinds. Could it be the case 
that core affect (the combination of valence and arousal) may be a natural kind? In order for core 
affect to be a natural kind all instances ranging from positive valence-low arousal to positive 
valence-high arousal to negative valence-low arousal to negative valence-high arousal would 
have to tend to share a family of co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism 
that brings about their co-occurrence non-accidentally. In other words, it would have to be the 
case that core affect fulfilled requirements 1 and 2 for natural kind status. Under this view, the 
circumplex as a whole would constitute a visual representation of a natural kind.  
As was shown in the previous two sections of this chapter, both valence and arousal are too 
heterogeneous to be natural kinds. There are distinct contrastive properties corresponding to the 
extremes of valence and arousal. It seems to follow that core affect is most likely not a natural 
kind because combining the heterogeneity of valence and arousal leads to even more 
heterogeneity. For example, instances of negatively valenced-highly aroused states are associated 
with an increase in autonomic activity and orientating behavior, whereas instances of positively 
valenced- low aroused states are associated with a decreases in autonomic activity and a lack of 
orientating behavior. These are heterogeneous properties that cannot be attributed to core affect 
as part of the natural property cluster. Decreased health benefits associated with negative valence 
and increased health benefits associated with positive valence is another heterogeneous property 
of core affect. Several other heterogeneous properties associated with the core affect category 
were discussed in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Thus, there is not a family of often co-occurring 
properties for core affect and core affect fails to fulfill requirement 1 for a natural kind sensu 
Boyd. Likewise there are multiple causal mechanisms associated with core affect. For example, 
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right-hemisphere activation is associated with negative valence and left-hemisphere activation is 
associated with positive valence. Thus core affect fails to fulfill requirement 2.  
To answer the question of this thesis (and this chapter): No, core affect is not a natural kind. 
The properties exhibited by core affective states are too heterogeneous for the entire class of core 
affect to form a natural kind. Under the view that the set of all core affective states is a natural 
kind the entire circumplex is a visual representation of a single natural kind. This is not the case. 
If any natural kinds are visually represented on the circumplex (i.e. if core affect remains a 
fruitful methodology for studying the emotions), then they must be sub-regions of the 
circumplex. In fact, empirical data appear to support the hypothesis that subsets of core affect are 
natural kinds.  
4.1.5- Are Subsets of Core Affect Natural Kinds? 
Even though core affect may not be a natural kind, there is a sense in which Barrett’s key 
hypothesis may be correct- certain sets of core affective states are likely natural kinds. Core 
affective states are varied combinations of valence and arousal levels. The empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the set of states corresponding to the four quadrants of the 
circumplex are natural kinds. That is, four subsets of core affective states appear to be natural 
kinds: the set of negatively valenced- high arousal states, the set of positively valenced- high 
arousal states, the set of negatively valenced- low arousal states, and the set of positively 
valenced- low arousal states. These four seem to fulfill requirements 1 and 2 for natural kind 
status. This claim is a consequence of the evidence presented in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Table 1 
below compiles all of the data provided in these previous sections. The table maps directly onto 
the four quadrants of the circumplex. I strongly encourage the reader to compare table 1 to the 
core affective circumplex on page 10.   
 
60 
Table 1 
Negative Valence/High Arousal Positive Valence/ High Arousal 
Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1): 
• Increased activation in brow area and corrugator 
(frown) facial muscle (in adults and infants) (-V) 
• Increased tension in corrugator (frown) facial 
muscle ( ↑ A) 
• General increase in autonomic nervous system 
activity, but significant heart rate deceleration (-
V) 
• Increased production in sweat glands ( ↑ A) 
• Increase in number of blink responses and shorter 
eye blinks (-V) 
• Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures less 
interesting, but choose to view them in longer 
time periods (-V) 
• Subjects attend more to emotionally salient 
pictures (-V) 
• Allocation of more attention to emotionally salient 
picture- Orientating behavior towards more- 
Increased memory allocation ( ↑ A) 
• Decreased health benefits, such as shorter life 
spans and worse overall mental and physical 
health (-V) 
Possible Causal  Mechanism (Requirement 2):  
• In general, more right-hemisphere activation   (-
V) 
Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1): 
• Increased activation in zygomatic (smile) facial 
muscle (in adults and infants) (+V) 
• Increased tension in zygomatic (smile) facial 
muscle ( ↑ A) 
• General decrease in autonomic nervous system 
activity, but greater peak heart rate acceleration 
(+V) 
• Increased production in sweat glands ( ↑ A) 
• Decrease in number of blink responses and 
quicker eye blinks (+V) 
• Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures more 
interesting, but choose to view then in shorter 
time periods (+V) 
• Subjects attend less to emotionally salient pictures 
(+V) 
• Allocation of more attention to emotionally salient 
pictures- Orientating behavior- Increased memory 
allocation ( ↑ A) 
• Increased health benefits, such as longevity and 
better overall mental and physical health (+V) 
 
 
Possible Causal  Mechanism (Requirement 2):  
• In general, more left-hemisphere activation (+V) 
Negative Valence/Low Arousal Positive Valence/Low Arousal 
Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1): 
• Increased activation in brow area and corrugator 
(frown) facial muscle (in adults and infants) (-V) 
• Less tension in brow area and corrugator (frown) 
facial muscle (↓ A) 
• General increase in autonomic nervous system 
activity, but significant heart rate deceleration (-
V) 
• Decreased production in sweat glands (↓ A) 
• Increase in number of blink responses and shorter 
eye blinks (-V) 
• Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures less 
interesting, but choose to view them in longer 
time periods (-V) 
• Subjects attend more to emotionally salient 
pictures (-V) 
• Allocation of less attention to emotionally salient 
picture- Lack of orientating behavior -----
Decreased memory allocation (↓ A) 
• Decreased health benefits, such as shorter life 
spans and worse overall mental and physical 
health (-V) 
Possible Causal  Mechanism (Requirement 2):  
• In general, more right-hemisphere activation        
(-V) 
Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1): 
• Increased activation in zygomatic (smile) facial 
muscle (in adults and infants) (+V) 
• Less tension in zygomatic (smile) facial muscle (↓ 
A)  
• General decrease in autonomic nervous system 
activity, but greater peak heart rate acceleration 
(+V) 
• Decreased production in sweat glands (↓ A) 
• Decrease in number of blink responses and 
quicker eye blinks (+V) 
• Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures more 
interesting, but choose to view then in shorter 
time periods (+V) 
• Subjects attend less to emotionally salient pictures 
(+V) 
• Allocation of less attention to emotionally salient 
picture- Lack of orientating behavior   (↓ A)- 
Decreased memory allocation (↓ A) 
• Increased health benefits, such as longevity and 
better overall mental and physical health (+V) 
 
 
Possible Causal  Mechanism (Requirement 2):  
• In general, more left-hemisphere activation (+V) 
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In light of the evidence there seem to be four natural kinds. That is, negative valence/high 
arousal, positive valence/high arousal, negative valence/low arousal, and negative valence/high 
arousal all appear to share their own a family of co-occurring properties and a causal 
(homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence non-accidentally. For example, 
the set of positively valenced and low arousal states is associated with increased activation in the 
zygomatic (smile) facial muscle, a general decrease in autonomic activity, lack of orientating 
behavior, and more left-hemisphere activation. From this information, scientists may be able to 
reliably predict that these properties will be observed when a subject is either viewing a picture 
rated as positively valenced and low arousal or experiencing this core affective state. Thus, the 
set of positively valenced and low arousal states would seem to support some preliminary 
generalizations.  
 It should also be noted that in so far as discrete emotions can be plotted on the 
circumplex they are likewise amenable to generalizations phrased in terms of valence and 
arousal. Since fear, anger, and disgust map onto the negative valence/high arousal quadrant of 
the circumplex, we can expect them to be associated with increased activation and tension in the 
corrugator (frown) facial muscle, orientating behavior, a general increase in autonomic activity, 
and more right-hemisphere activation. Thus, preliminary generalizations and predictions retain 
the basicness of valence and arousal, and apply to some discrete emotions.  
The claim that there may be four subsets of core affective states that are natural kinds is 
an empirical hypothesis and so is revisable in light of further empirical data. In fact, we should 
expect that these proposed four natural kinds will be revised. At present we have only a 
rudimentary understanding of the causal mechanisms. We can localize a causal mechanism for 
positive valence somewhere in the left-hemisphere and for negative valence somewhere in the 
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right-hemisphere. The causal mechanism is even less clear for arousal. Generalizations and 
predictions will become more powerful as we gain a further understanding of the causal 
mechanisms underlying these natural kinds. 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
To summarize, I have explained a new and interesting theory of the emotions: core affect 
(Ch.2). I then presented Barrett’s arguments against the natural kind status of discrete emotions 
and in favor of the natural kind status of core affect (Ch.3). I then argued that while core affect is 
likely not a natural kind, four subsets of core affective states (negative valence/high arousal, 
positive valence/high arousal, negative valence/low arousal, and positive valence/low arousal) 
may be natural kinds (Ch.4). The empirical evidence presented in table 1 supports my argument: 
there is a family of often co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that 
brings about the co-occurrence non-accidentally for each of these subsets of core affect. Thus, 
there appear to be four natural kinds within the core affective category. I would like to end with a 
brief discussion of what I think core affect can add to emotion theory and a general lesson for 
emotion theorists looking for natural kinds: splitting proposed kinds is the best avenue for 
discovering natural kinds. 
As I previously mentioned, the dominant paradigm in emotion theory is the discrete emotion 
approach and the central concern has been locating natural kinds of discrete emotions. I think 
that there is something that discrete emotion theorists can take from this notion of splitting core 
affect and the tentative correlation between arousal and valence. One of the main reasons Barrett 
claims that the discrete emotions are not natural kinds is because they assume that folk categories 
of emotions, such as “anger,” must corresponds to a scientific category, anger. Typically folk 
terms must be refined so as to fit the causal structure of the world. The discrete emotion theorists 
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seem to have forgotten that in order to find a natural kind we must fit our terms to the causal 
structure of the world (for a similar argument see Griffiths 2004a). Perhaps it is time for discrete 
emotion theorists to take seriously Russell’s suggestion that arousal levels may distinguish a 
number discrete emotions that are otherwise difficult to separate scientifically (such as sadness, 
disgust, contempt, anger). 
A similar moral ought to be drawn by core affect theorists. Even when we start with 
“scientific” terms or concepts, we still may need to revise them in light of empirical data. Our 
goal is to make our terms fit the causal structure of the world if we want to find natural kinds 
sensu Boyd. Core affect theorists appear to be right that valence and arousal are important in 
understanding the emotions, but their own research suggests that core affect is not a natural kind. 
The evidence suggests that core affect needs to be further refined if it is to be scientifically 
fruitful as a natural kind. 
Several philosophical points follow from my tentative conclusion that there are four potential 
natural kinds within the core affective category. First, it may often be the case that splitting a 
proposed kind is more likely to yield natural kinds. Second, philosophy has more to offer 
scientists than just conceptual analysis. Of course this is an important part of philosophy of 
science. I have pointed to several problems with the core affect theory (see chapter 2). But what 
my tentative conclusion shows is that philosophy can also contribute and direct future scientific 
research by a careful analysis not only of the theory, but also of the empirical data. Given my 
conclusion further research on the core affective category should focus on the extremes of the 
dimensions and further correlating these extremes. Thus, philosophy can assist in directing 
scientific research not only by arm chair analysis or by using anecdotal evidence in arguments, 
but also by getting our hands dirty and really analyzing the available evidence.   
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 In conclusion, the best shot at locating natural kinds is empirically reformed revisions of 
the category. In the case of core affect, the category appears to need to be split. Four subsets of 
core affect are likely natural kinds. That is, the set of negative valence-high arousal states may be 
a natural kind, as well as each of the other three core affective states corresponding to the 
quadrants of the circumplex. It may also be the case that some of the discrete emotions need to 
be split, perhaps on the basis of differing arousal levels. If we are after natural kinds, then we 
must fit our categories to what Boyd calls the sometimes messy and complex causal structure of 
the world (1991, 143). This may inevitably mean splitting what we thought before was a natural 
kind. This is surely a small price to pay for the potential consequence of finding new categories 
suitable for scientific study and analysis. 
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